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Challenges & Responses to Conflictual Politics

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Archive for the ‘State News’ Category

India’s ‘Assange’ crusades against corruption -Sudha G Tilak

Posted by admin On November - 4 - 2012 Comments Off

Arvind Kejriwal and his supporters use protests to reinforce their anti-corruption message [EPA]
In a country where accountability and transparency are often thought of as the first causalities of holding public office, Arvind Kejriwal, a mechanical engineer and former bureaucrat from Haryana, has blown the whistle on India’s corrupt.

In the last fortnight, he has released details and levelled charges four times against top Indian politicians and the country’s biggest business conglomerate.

“We want to turn the power structure upside-down and make the powerful accountable,” Kejriwal, 44, a thin man with a moustache and piercing eyes, said.

India’s middle class population, which prefers to bemoan the state of chaos and corruption in the nation, have found in Kejriwal a person who is not afraid to bring forth allegations of fraud to the doorstep of India’s leaders.

It’s been a long and busy day for Kejriwal following his string of revelations and corruption charges in the past fortnight on many of India’s leading political and business figures. He disengages from throngs of his followers of the India Against Corruption (IAC), a people’s organisation he founded in 2006 encouraging public engagement.

“People of this country are fed up, and the conditions are right for a movement to set things right,” he said in an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera.

Targeting the mighty

“It’s not about sensational exposures… The intent is to bring a radical change in politics and accountability.”

- Arvind Kejriwal

 

Charging the country’s most powerful with corruption, Kejriwal has discomforted the government. “They have found the ground beneath their feet shaken”, he exclaimed.

However, he is wary of the title India’s Julian Assange, the founder of the whistle-blowing organisation WikiLeaks now wanted by the US government for making top secret government documents available to the public, which some have bestowed upon him.

“It’s not about sensational exposures,” he said. “The intent is to bring a radical change in politics and accountability.”

Kejriwal’s accusations are based on government documents he says are proof of corruption, which he had obtained using the Right to Information Act, under which any citizen may compel the government to share information.

On October 5, Kejriwal made a public accusation against Robert Vadra, son-in-law of Congress party president Sonia Gandhi. He claimed that Vadra had purchased property worth millions of dollars with “interest free unsecured free loan” by DLF, India’s major construction company. DLF’s market value dropped in a single day to the tune of $580m following the accusation.

A week later Kejriwal pinpointed financial irregularities to the tune of Rs 71 lakh ($130,000) by the Zakir Hussain Memorial Trust, a non-governmental organisation for the disabled that is headed by federal minister Salman Khurshid and his wife Louise. He took to the streets with his followers saying the Khurshids had misappropriated funds allocated for the physically challenged to distribute tricycles and hearing aids for the needy across 17 districts of Uttar Pradesh. A Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report (CAG) had earlier reported the irregularities too.

Then, on October 17, Kejriwal targeted the opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). He accused party president Nitin Gadkari of land grabbing by colluding with the ruling party in the western state of Maharashtra, and exploiting poor farmers to further his business interests in real estate.

And most recently, on October 31, Kejriwal accused India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the country’s largest business empire Reliance Industries Limited (RIL)’s chairman of malpractice. He alleged the government of going soft on RIL, allowing them to amass undue profits beyond its contract to develop the country’s key natural gas field in the Krishna Godavari (KG) basin. He also said the RIL was responsible for the unnatural rise in prices of gas at “three times higher than normal”.

Pursuing the truth

Despite strong denials from those who stand accused, Kejriwal’s revelations have undoubtedly stirred the establishment.

 
Anna Hazare, right,  was Kejriwal’s mentor, but the two
have parted ways now [AP]
 

Robert Vadra, Sonia Gandhi’s son-in-law, has denied the charges brought against him; DLF has also denied offering favourable discounts for purchase of property. Gandhi, for her part, has remained silent on the matter, refraining from making any public statements.

Kejriwal brushed aside the defences of Vadra and senior Congress leaders, saying their clarifications were “half-truths and lies”.

For their part, Salman and Louise Khurshid made a televised appearance denying the charges of misappropriating funds, and are seeking defamation damages to the tune of Rs 100 crore ($20m). In response, Kejriwal decided to take the matter further and staged a massive rally in Farrukhabad, Khurshid’s constituency, on November 1, urging voters not to re-elect him.

Opposition leader Gadkari and representatives of RIL have also issued statements denying Kejriwal’s charges.

Critics say that Kejriwal has been acting like a political novice by releasing a slew of allegations that may not come to much. Khurshid, for once, has said that Kejriwal was “an ant taking on the might of an elephant”.

Kejriwal accepts that survival in Indian politics against established political behemoths requires “strategic planning”, acknowledging that his “timing could have been planned better”.

While Kejriwal admits he is still learning, he believes that the truth will prevail. “Remember they may have survived for many decades in politics, but we too are formidable foes in pursuing truth,” he said.

Symbol of discontent

To his credit, Kejriwal’s accusations seem to have emboldened the people, created awareness, and incited the press to pursue and investigate the allegations. 

For many people, Kejriwal is a symbol of India’s growing discontent with corruption and inefficiency. The country saw a groundswell of support when he, along with veteran social activist Anna Hazare, sought to demand greater accountability from India’s government with 2011′s Lokpal (Ombudsman) Bill.

Followers say Kejriwal pursues a simple lifestyle, living with his bureaucrat wife and two children in a housing colony in New Delhi. His office is crammed with people and sports basic facilities.

After differences broke out between Hazare and Kejriwal, the latter has chosen to go alone with the IAC.

“Anna and I are on different paths now, but our goal to fight corruption is the same”, he said.
“The powerful cannot face the truth I show them for long, and will need to offer clean politics.”

- Arvind Kejriwal

 

Kejriwal hails from a middle class family in Haryana, and gave up his government job to take on public life. “My journey has been one that has slowly and surely gained force to challenge corruption and bribery in public life to make India better.”

Kejriwal objects to the fact that “power is vested in a political establishment in Delhi and in state capitals. It needs to be people-centric”. His use of street protests has earned him the respect of the middle class.

However, his critics say that his brand of protest will probably not bring a massive overhaul of India’s corrupt systems. If his revelations have not led to any resignations or arrests, they wonder what his protests will be able to amount to.

“The powerful cannot face the truth I show them for long, and will need to offer clean politics”, Kejriwal explained.

“My movement will survive as long as the people of this country demand justice. I see that people have woken up and are ready for change. I am optimistic about the future.”
 
 
Source: Al Jazeera 
 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/20121149541168660.html

The unlearned lesson of 1962-K. Shankar Bajpai

Posted by admin On November - 2 - 2012 Comments Off

We lacked statecraft 50 years ago. But we are no better today, as our bad habits persist while the vitiating pressures have become even more alarming

Our extensive retrospection on the drubbing we contrived to suffer in October-November 1962, ought to be as salutary as it is necessary, but the right questions must be asked — and by the right people. What went wrong, who were the villains, can there be a repeat, are we better prepared — all these carry many lessons but the comprehensiveness of our failures points to an equally comprehensive weakness: we could not behave as a state capable of looking after its affairs. Beyond material strengths, it is how one functions that counts. Without underestimating all that we have since achieved, we must realise that our bad habits have not improved while the vitiating pressures have become even more alarming.

Assess challenges
Any state expecting to be taken seriously must first organise itself to behave seriously. Assess the challenges you may face, distinguish between the imminent and contingent, inform yourself as fully as possible on relevant data, with specific intelligence on what the sources of challenge might be up to, assess the capabilities — of yourself and others — calculate whether you have or can develop those capabilities up to required levels, whether you need to temporise or seek external balancing arrangements, not least consider how the global situation might affect your interest; then plan, prepare, implement. These elements of statecraft are so rudimentary, they shouldn’t need enumeration, but statecraft is precisely what we have lacked: 1962 was the culmination of many years of what might most politely be called amateurishness in all these respects.

Just how badly we lacked the two essentials of statecraft — careful judgment and appropriate action — were underlined by two different authors of our debacle. Jawaharlal Nehru himself confessed to the first, telling Parliament on October 25: “We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world, and were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation.” Today’s realities are no less compelling, but no less lost in “the artificial atmosphere” we persist in creating for ourselves. Is there any part of our political spectrum in the least interested in learning from any aspect of 1962?

On our second failure, just how unbelievably we acted is brought out vividly, if unintentionally, in B.N. Mullik’s Chinese Betrayal. The title itself ‘betrays’ a fault: the shocked, hurt, accusatory blaming of others, blind to one’s own responsibility. What did the Chinese ‘betray’, except our folly? They behaved as states do and we did not: work with care and calculation towards chosen ends. In that process, they made fools of us but whether that reflects their duplicity or our ineptitude is quite a question.

Still apparently revered in our intelligence ranks, Mullik, virtually the first Indian head of the Intelligence Bureau, depicts a handful of courtiers milling around as though trying to anticipate what a Shahinshah would like. As in a court, a mere handful of favourites appear to run everything — Defence Minister Krishna Menon, Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai, Defence Joint Secretary Harish Sarin (a fine officer caught in a quandary) and, of course, our ubiquitous author, with the Army Chief and some others periodically roped in. The Cabinet hardly mattered, the Secretary General, External Affairs, and the Defence Secretary had no role, no structured, systematic decision-making process was ever attempted — the Defence Minister’s daily meetings, triggered by September 8, seem to have been occasions primarily for Mr. Mullik to poke his nose into Army affairs.

Mullik records innumerable examples of egregiousness. “By August 1962 [Lt. Gen. B.K.] Kaul and Krishna Menon were practically not on speaking terms.” On September 17, KM accordingly rejects Mullik’s urgings to call Kaul back from leave as CGS. But on October 1, he somersaults, appointing Kaul Corps Commander against Mullik’s professed objections. The only reason — the Minister thought it would please Nehru to see a fellow Kashmiri appointed. Then comes surely the most bizarre conduct of battles in history: the front Commander evacuated from the front, issuing orders to it from his sick-bed 1000 km away in Delhi, with the Defence Minister, the Army Chief and the great IB Director in nightly attendance.

Confusion in Assam
The episode that would be most farcical of all, were it not the most heartbreaking, was the withdrawal of civil administration from northern Assam. Mullik recalls the Cabinet ordering the civil administration to remain in place. He arrives with Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in Tezpur to learn that, instead, it has been ordered out of all the north. Rushing back to Delhi, he discovers the Assam Governor persuaded Cabinet Ministers to change their original orders — but the Prime Minister has no idea how the change was made! To cap it all, our hero decides to leave the IB and return to Assam to organise guerrilla resistance when the Chinese moved in — apparently forgetting that a ceasefire and withdrawal had been proclaimed three days earlier.

One day he is recommending various Army appointments, even a new Army Chief, another he is flying off to the front to have his say on operations, shuttling back and forth thrice in the crucial week. As late as two weeks before the Chinese attack of October 20, he is insisting that the only real danger is Pakistan, where “Ayub was on the prowl”; seven years after being proved wrong, he still insists he was right. That he had no business being involved in any of these things, but sticking to providing intelligence, never enters his mind.

Let us not just blame individuals: the whole system, if one can call it that, was sheer Alice-in-Wonderland. Every leader specially trusts someone, consulting him/her even on extraneous matters, but such wholesale meddling, or Krishna Menon’s manipulations and prejudices, which most of all undermined the Army morale and efficiency and corrupted policy, are the hallmarks of old, personalised, court-style government. Lately, the fashion has grown to criticise Panditji for everything that went, or is, wrong with us. Given his surpassing command of the country he cannot, of course, be spared: even allowing for the still underestimated intrigues to misuse the China crisis to unseat him (with no little encouragement from external sources), his responsibility for mishandling is undeniable. He was so great, we owe him so much, and need his kind of approach to building up India so badly, noting his faults is no diminution of his stature, but that is not our Indian way: our heroes are faultless, our villains wholly evil. Such attitudes leave no scope for objective, dispassionate, impersonal thinking.

Of course individuals matter — in India far more than in countries where institutions and methodical processes minimise the idiosyncratic — but to let them take over or bypass institutions and run things by whim is to sink back into medieval ways. In that respect, how different is today from then? Despite our successes in consolidating democracy, we have still not accepted the concept of the state as an entity intended to serve all of society and demanding the loyalty of all citizens above all their other affiliations. For us, the state is the ruler, which readily leads into the habits of the Mughal court habits so prevalent by 1962, that they more than anything else led to our humiliation — much as at Plassey. They are now rampant.

Contrast in attitude
There is a lesson even in the contrast between our commemoration of what happened 50 years ago and China’s studied silence. We are spared the mortification of her celebrating a victory, not because what weighs so heavily on us was a minor episode to the Chinese: enough has come out to indicate how purposefully they planned their major enterprise (though misreading us too). The current show of indifference represents the calculated pursuit of national ends, as against our excitable, ad hoc ways.

From misreadings of what might happen, to the north-eastern chaos following defeat, how we handled affairs then displays a state simply not organised to cope with major challenges. Doubtless, we now have more professionalism in many ways. The NSA and the NSC apparatus constitute a vast improvement; there is also an incipient strategic community to guide public opinion. But public opinion has become less open to guidance, political circles have become even more impervious to facts, reality or sense, and our politico-administrative complex is more cumbersome, unproductive and parochial. Whether our military are better equipped, or have the required infrastructure or intelligence inputs, etc., are vital questions but secondary to our overriding concern: how mature is the Indian state now?

One only has to ask to start worrying.

(K. Shankar Bajpai is former Ambassador to Pakistan, China & the U.S., and Secretary, External Affairs Ministry)

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-unlearned-lesson-of-1962/article4055276.ece?homepage=true

Q&A: Yogendra Yadav, Political Strategist, IAC

Posted by admin On November - 1 - 2012 Comments Off

WHILE ARVIND KEJRIWAL and the India Against Corruption (IAC) team have managed to hog the headlines for two straight weeks, what appears in bold is often shrill, party polemic. Necessary to keep them firmly in the public eye, but not enough to give a sense of what India’s newest political party is all about. For those insights, TEHELKA turned to Yogendra Yadav, a member of the core team and a strategist for the proposed party. Yadav, a senior fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, is an election analyst with three decades of experience, and until recently, described himself as a “friend of the Anna movement”. Yadav spoke to Revati Laul about why he signed up for the political outfit and where it’s going.

 
Photo: Shailendra Pandey
 

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EDITED EXCERPTS FROM AN INTERVIEW

The IAC has been successful in harnessing fresh scams in support of the anticorruption cause and making sure that it stays in the public eye. How much of this is strategy and what is the next step?
Since the 2 October announcement on the intention to form a political party, we have had a multi-pronged strategy. What have come into the limelight are, of course, the exposés. The idea was not to target this or that leader; we wanted to demonstrate that the entire political establishment is not just corrupt but also in collusion with one another. There is a conspiracy of silence in which the media also participates. We wanted to break this code of silence.

Any other aspect of this strategy?
The other visible action is in the form of agitations on the ground on electricity and water issues. The point here is not just the usual complaints about unaffordable rates; our aim is to bring out the fraudulence in the fixation of rates and the collusion between the government, the ‘independent regulator’ and the private distributors. The campaign is meant to target a cross-section of the aam aadmi. This campaign hints at the kind of issues that we are likely to take up, who we stand with and what kind of policies we are going to oppose.

And there was a part of the strategy that’s not been in the media glare, which you were talking about.
Yes, that is the organisational consolidation and expansion of the movement. The IAC has brought the core energy and volunteers that were necessary for this political formation, but it wasn’t sufficient. This needed to be supplemented by other pre-existing people’s movements across India. Many individuals, organisations, movements and parties — more than I had hoped for — may come on board.

Can you name those who have come on board?
No one has signed on formally, for there is no party as yet. But I can mention the groups with whom serious discussions are going on. There is the Internationalist Democratic Party, which owes its ideological roots to radical humanist thinker MN Roy, and has a presence in J&K, Punjab and Rajasthan. Samajwadi Jan Parishad, a party established by Kishen Pattnayak, has a presence in Odisha, north Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, MP and Maharashtra. Sarvodaya Karnataka, led by Dalit writer Devanoor Mahadeva, is a unique political experiment that brings together Dalits and farmers. Then there’s the Uttarakhand Lok Vahini led by Shamsher Singh Bisht, the Lok Sangharsh Morcha in north Maharashtra, Nationalist Communist Party, Women’s Front from Tamil Nadu and some factions of the Bharatiya Kisan Union. I could go on and on, but the point is that the new formation strives to be the nationwide political instrument of all the people’s movements.

‘Anna may have done us a favour by asking difficult questions that people wish to ask of a new political party’
 
 
What about the ideological base of the party? Where would you place it on the spectrum from Left to Right?
I’m not sure if the Left-Right spectrum is a good way to capture ideological differences in India. Anyway, the conversations with people’s movements aren’t just organisational, they are also ideological. The movement against corruption has broadened its ideological stance; this permits a convergence with people’s movements. The one thing our draft vision statement has been very careful about is not to attach this to any readymade ‘ism’. Unfortunately, so much of politics gets bogged down in icons and the ‘holy book’. If there is a holy book for us, it is the Constitution of India. The Preamble firmly places us for equality rather than against it, for social justice and not any ‘meritocracy’. The Directive Principles of the Constitution mandate a radical decentralisation of political power. Priorities, needs and interests of the last person must be the touchstone for public policy.

Once you are a full-fledged party, you will need to have a stance on Kashmir, Naxalism, defence spending, etc.
Patriotism is the moving spirit behind this movement. But its patriotism is not a narrow-minded ethnic or religious nationalism. We draw inspiration from the broadminded nationalism represented by our freedom struggle.

What does this mean for political struggles such as Kashmir or Telangana?
Spelling out this standpoint in each specific instance will take time and a lot more discussion. Rather than rush into taking a position, we need to have long and, perhaps, difficult conversations on these issues first.

What is the IAC’s stand on the economy?
Our vision document doesn’t shy away from taking positions on the economy. At the same time, it doesn’t commit itself to one mechanism for realising economic objectives. Our objectives are clear: all the citizens must receive free, equal and quality education; universal healthcare must be guaranteed; there must be jobs for all, remunerative prices for farmers and protection for unorganised workers. But we are open to arguments and evidence on what is the best way to attain these objectives.

When Arvind Kejriwal says that it’s beneath him to answer Digvijaya Singh’s questions, doesn’t he end up sounding as arrogant as the UPA government?
We, who demand transparency and accountability of everyone else, cannot demand immunity for ourselves. This isn’t why Arvind refused to be drawn into the questions. The points raised by Digvijaya Singh have all been addressed in the past. Repeating those answers is to get into a defensive game. Besides, the UPA government has access to every document pertaining to the conduct of Arvind. Why don’t they come out with the papers? Why don’t they institute a credible and independent inquiry? We had made a similar demand into the allegations concerning the Bhushans as well. We don’t know why the government hasn’t acceded to this demand.

Land rights activist Ulka Mahajan recently told TEHELKA that while the IAC has given more people the courage to speak out against the powerful, the real work is in preparing people to fight for their rights. Many people from grassroots movements have a similar critique of the IAC
I understand and respect Ulka’s point of view. Many friends and comrades in people’s movements feel that direct intervention in electoral politics is not their priority at this stage. Therefore, we don’t have on board many activists and organisations that we would have liked to. I must confess that I miss the absence of leaders such as Medha Patkar, Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey in this new formation. I continue to see them as my friends, comrades and heroes even if they aren’t with us today. From a different side, I’d also miss Jayaprakash Narayan of Loksatta or Swati and Ramesh Ramanathan of Janagraha. Our short-term priorities and assessments may be different, but I continue to believe that, in the medium run, we are all fellow travellers.

How involved will the IAC be in the upcoming Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh polls?
The new party will not even have a legal existence in the eyes of the Election Commission by the time the states go to the polls. Clearly, this isn’t where we might focus our energies. At the most, there may be something experimental or symbolic. The first real test, if you will, of the new party may be the 2013 Delhi Assembly poll where we intend to contest seriously. But that is only the starting point; we are in it for the long run. This is a diverse and complex country and any attempt at systemic change has to be a long-term process.

What about the 2014 General Election?
It may be too early for us to be able to spell that out. It will really depend on what organisational shape we are in and so on.

Do you see a possible return of Anna Hazare to the IAC? Or is that off the table?
Anna and Arvind represent two different ways of realising a shared objective. To my mind, these are complementary ways, even though they do not seem so in the short run. Anna may have done us a favour by asking difficult questions that ordinary people wish to ask of any new political party. By demonstrating a resolve to go ahead with the party, with or without Anna, we may have made it easier for Anna to support this political initiative without being a part of it.

Revati Laul is a Special Correspondent with Tehelka.

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main54.asp?filename=Ne101112Yogendra.asp

The Faltering Miracle Story of India-Anjan Chakrabarti

Posted by admin On October - 29 - 2012 Comments Off

Last time Indian economy ran into a major systemic crisis was in the late 1980s; it was a result of and also the final nail in the coffin of state sponsored planned economy. Along with the collapse of Soviet style command economies, it signalled the unsustainability of economic system built on absolute or near total control of state over the economy. That crisis helped spread the philosophy of neoliberalism in India which led to this lesson from the experience of centralized planning: for the goals of rapid economic growth and poverty reduction, state control over the market economy does not work and hence should be abandoned. Since then, structural adjustment program evolved in a gradual process of two decades, giving rise to a competitive market economy that is integrated into the global economy; as against the privileged position of planners, this new paradigm also protracted the supremacy of the mass of homoeconomicus (optimizing economic man, whether as consumers or producers) whose decision making transpiring in and through this global competitive market regime are supposed to generate the economy wide outcomes that are efficient. A connection between macroeconomics and microeconomics is thus made whereby the macroeconomic outcomes were seen as result of microeconomic behaviour in a competitive market economy1; it was believed that such a connection will produce high growth rate regime, stable and reasonable inflation and rapid employment in the industrialized sector (inclusive of manufacturing and services). Among the microeconomic decision makers were, of course, the global capitalist enterprises which, like the homoeconomicus as consumers, were taken as privileged for they were seen as essential instruments of generating high value and hence growth. Evidently, this competitive market economy helped create and facilitate global capitalism in the Indian economy. It is to this structural change that we move next.

Problem over Sharing the Indian Growth Miracle

As it has evolved gradually through an assortment of reforms, this paradigm shift produced a structural remapping of Indian economy taking the shape of circuits-camp of global capital qua global capitalism and its outside world of the third2. This changing map of Indian economy was driven by, among other things, the primacy accorded to global capitalist performance, appropriation and distribution of surplus which, via high growth rate, resulted in the expansion of the circuits-camp of global capitalism; this expansion, not surprisingly, meant a war on, or primitive accumulation of, world of the third3. In other words, process of primitive accumulation ensured that growth has been exclusionary (that is, devoid of trickle down effects), where the exclusion has taken two forms: one, by excluding a vast section of the population from the benefits of rising income growth, a phenomenon symbolized by worsening Gini coefficient, and two, further exacerbating existing social inequities (based on caste, ethnicity, gender, etc.). In fact, the dual phenomena of income equality and social inequity compensated, complemented and reinforced one another to exclude a large section of Indian population (residing in the margins of the circuits-camp of global capital and world of the third) from the benefits of economic growth; while due to measurement problems there is some controversy over the exact trend of income poverty, there is a strong indication that non-income factors of poverty (captured by the statistics of malnutrition, health, education, etc.) may have stagnated or worsened. The overall picture is that of a country of increased prosperity (concentrated in the hub of the circuits-camp of global capital) but growing divide as well.

The event of exclusionary growth was acknowledged and internalized by the policy circle and many economists after the disaster of ‘Shining India’ in the 2004 elections; it was agreed that exclusionary growth must be tempered by an attempt to include the left out population through redistribution of benefits of economic growth; inclusive development aspires to become the new national trope supposedly uniting Indians, notwithstanding their other differences, into a single national project of development in which all are participants and beneficiaries4. Rather than being in conflict, this imagery sees growth and redistribution as complementarity; high growth (that is, a bigger pie) sustains greater redistribution and greater redistribution in the form of more productive investment among the poor is supposed to secure and propel further growth. Global capitalism (circuits-camp of global capital), working via the competitive market economy, is thus not only good in itself because it rapidly expands growth. It also has instrumental value by delivering direct benefits of growth (the trickle-down effect) and indirect benefit of growth (through redistribution) to reduce poverty; the former will function through market (which, in Indian case, even the policy makers agree is weak) and latter through the intervention of the state. At another level we can interpret this imagery and its underlying policy paradigm as trying to combine the capitalist performance, appropriation, distribution and surplus in a global setting that is fundamentally private-centric and the domain of redistribution which is fundamentally state-centric. Thus, Indian state now encapsulates two rationales, one liberal (minimal interference in the competitive market economy, that is, in the circuits-camp of global capital) and the other dirigiste (directly intervening and controlling the redistribution process to world of the third); it combines these to secure the modernization process via the expansion of global capitalism (or, circuits-camp of global capital). This is projected as a truly win-win situation which is a result of the gift of globalization and the benefits derived from it in the form of enhanced wealth creation that the integration of Indian economy into a globalized world has enabled. Not only has the Indian growth miracle permanently arrived, but inclusive development enables the entire country – all population – to share and be a partner in this miracle. It is of course another matter that rulers at different times spare no effort in producing and disseminating pictures (in which nothing can seemingly go wrong) that in the end turn out to be delusional; previously, the picture of ‘Garibi Hatao’ and ‘Shining India’ were two such pictures. As in all case of delusional pictures that promise everything to everybody, this imagery is now in a state of crisis in more than one ways. We discuss one axis of that crisis here.

Microfoundation of Macroeconomics: A recipe to end depression or to begin one

Critical to this imagery is the assumption of high growth; an assumption bolstered no doubt by the actual realization of high growth rate regime which in turn is traced to the creation of a competitive market economy. This in turn has led to a sacrosanct belief and robust defence of the competitive market economy as against state intervention/control, and global capitalism as against national capitalism. However, since 2007, that growth story is in serious danger which in turn forces our attention to areas taken thus far as immune from discussion. In fact, Indian economy’s trouble expands well beyond the faltering growth story. In the last five years, Indian economy has slowly moved into a terrain of a deep crisis, perhaps in the same scale as the earlier one; in the sense that it is threatening to take the semblance of a systemic crisis. This time though, with a drastically truncated role of state vis a vis market and weak trade union opposition, the blame for this crisis can only fall on the combined effects of neoliberal globalization and global capitalism or the mechanism of global capitalist centred production, distribution and consumption of goods and services functioning through the conduit of competitive market economy. Is it then the case that the source of the systemic crisis resides in the illness of competitive market economy? This though is not the accepted position; nor is it yet the point of debate in India.

The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh insists that Indian economy’s fundamentals are robust, and hence its growth story, while faltering in the short run, is protected in the long run. If we accept Keynes’ dictum that ‘in the long run we are all dead’ (by the way, five years is not a very short period either) which in no small part is substantiated by the overdetermined and contradictory processes pulling and pushing the Indian economy into who knows where, then a question crops up. What is meant by saying that the fundamentals of the economy are strong?

Now, surely the Prime Minister is not referring to the macroeconomic fundamentals. A cursory glance at the basic indicators tells a sorry story in that front: growth rate is falling, inflation rate is resiliently high (transpiring, says RBI, mostly from supply side factors which keeps accumulating the problem), falling private saving and investment, growing current account deficit driven mainly by worsening trade deficit, pressure on capital account, declining rupee value and at times volatile exchange rate movement, and increasing fiscal deficit. This is indeed a case of fundamentals gone haywire and, as we are witness to, seem to be resiliently invariant to policy changes (pertaining to fiscal, monetary and exchange rate regimes), that are transpiring rapidly, being fired from all possible directions; this trouble is in fact finding further fodder through the global inter-linkages that is exporting the global problems into India in plentiful forms (the deleterious effects from Europe being the latest addition) thereby aggravating an already difficult situation. The trouble is not merely that the economy is faltering, but that the process is transpiring in a dynamic environment that is private (competitive market economy) and global, in which many processes/variables are not under the control of the policy makers if they are at all known to them in the first place. So much has been talked about the benefits India has garnered from its integration into the global economy; our mainstream friends would like us to be held captive by that picture. Yet, the last five years have shown that there is a cost of this integration too which now can hardly be left unquestioned. A lesson: there is no win-win harvesting from globalization. Like all other entities, the process of globalization is beset with overdetermination and contradiction, throwing up unpredictable outcomes and harbouring unknown possibilities, and for a competitive market economy integrated into a globalized world thus suggests the existence and the need to not only accept the possibility of business cycles, but also of breakdowns.5

If not macroeconomics, it then appeals to reason that the Prime Minister must be referring to the strong fundamentals pertaining to microeconomic environment; this can only mean the competitive market economy materializing from the liberalization policies of the last two decades. The suggestion here is that creating such an economy has succeeded in producing a level effect meaning that the minimum bar on the growth rate has been permanently raised as compared to that of the planning era. As a justification of this position, the high growth rate in the previous decade is presented as a proof. If this is accepted then it follows that the neoliberal policies by creating this competitive market economy have done a service to India. Because of the level of high growth rate, India stands a better chance not only to become richer but also reduce its poverty sharply.6 But then, if we are to accept this, how do we reconcile a sound microeconomic environment with a disturbing macroeconomic picture? How could the two set of fundamentals be moving in opposite directions? Can they in the first place do so? This leads to a deeper issue as the following argues. Let us begin by positing the position of neoliberal economics.

That sound microeconomic picture can co-exist with a systemic failure at the macro level is contrary to the neoliberal dictum which theorizes a picture of macro economy emanating from microeconomics; this is now the consensus of mainstream neo-classical economics. In addition to this frame as being methodologically robust in the sense of capturing the concrete reality, it is further held that a competitive market economy functioning with a supporting but non-intervening state7 will produce better macroeconomic outcomes than otherwise. And, to cap it all, such an economic system rules out systemic failures such as depression; any state interference here will produce an inferior outcome or worse; the role of state is only to ensure that competitive market economy is created, facilitated and secured from outside interference (such as anti-competitive practices, trade union activities, expropriation, etc.) and its own discretionary behaviour (following rules is better than discretionary policies). The confidence entrusted in this new paradigm can be gauged from the following quote in a Nobel Prize acceptable speech by Robert Lucas.

Macroeconomics was born as a distinct field in the 1940’s, as part of the intellectual response to the Great Depression. The term then referred to the body of knowledge and expertise that we hoped would prevent the recurrence of that economic disaster. My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades. There remain important gains in welfare from better fiscal policies, but I argue that these are gains from providing people with better incentives to work and save, not from better fine-tuning of spending flows. Taking U.S. performance over the past 50 years as a benchmark, the potential for welfare gains from between long-run, supply-side policies exceeds by far the potential from further improvements in short-run demand management. (Robert E. Lucas, JR. 2003)

Coming from arguably the chief architect of modern macroeconomics and the economist principally responsible for demolishing Keynesian macroeconomics, the claim that depression – the term mainstream economics uses to signify economic breakdown as opposed to business cycle or fluctuations around trend which is regular – is over was a colossal claim8; colossal but also one which fell flat with the appearance of the global economic crisis. It showed that macroeconomics has still not solved its self-proclaimed central problem of depression and by corollary that what some such as Paul Krugman calls the ‘voodoo’ economics of supply-side is, to put it mildly, deeply problematical. Paraphrasing Lucas from our vantage point it appears that Marx’s observation of capitalist economic system containing the seeds of its breakdown was true in 1940s as it is now. The trouble is that the ‘voodoo’ economics continue to be the dominant economics, whereby its influence is deeply rooted in the currently policy making circles; even as depression can no longer be denied, the theoretical consensus that had resulted from the anti-Keynesian revolution enacted by supply side macroeconomics continue to hold considerable sway. And this theoretical consensus presents a deeper trouble. It lies in the inherent claim that a global capitalist regime under the conditions of free agents functioning in a competitive market economy with minimal state interference will lead to the disappearance of systemic failure such as that epitomized by depression.

If evidence is any proof (and economists revel in it), then we can conclude that there must be something fundamentally wrong with the axiom of Cartesian methodological individualism in a competitive market economy producing a depression free system. This hypothesis evidently rules out any autonomy to the economic structure which is specified in neoclassical economics as general equilibrium economy. If autonomy of structure is granted then that could carry the possibility of effects and outcomes irreducible exclusively to the optimizing behaviour of the agents interacting through market.9 However, unless we agree that this autonomy exists, it becomes difficult to locate and explain the appearance of the current economic crisis that is now global. That being the case, one of the central hypotheses of neoliberal economics – if individuals are free decision-makers, markets are self-regulating and hence sufficient for the system – becomes moot. Markets do have unique features and effects, but to enable a depression free economy is certainly not its forte. In short, the framework of neo-liberalism or its economic discipline of neoclassical economics cannot explain systemic collapse. In contrast, Keynes and Marx, in their own different ways, insisted on the relative autonomy of the structure, a relative autonomy that can be traced to the structure and, at times, the non-optimizing behaviour of the agents. It has also been suggested by others that parts do not add up to the whole; that the whole also needs to be specified and analysed in terms of its unique features and effects.10 This is not to say that individual decisions and market do not influence the structure (we believe that they certain do), but that structure cannot be seen as mere sum total of individual decisions.

If, in contrast, we accept that indeed microeconomic foundations produce macro economy or even go with our milder proposition that microeconomics do partially, but not totally, influence macroeconomics, then one must confer some quarter of blame (and if we are to follow the framework of neoclassical economics) to the kind of basic economy that constitutes microeconomics. Merely blaming the Indian economic crisis on the global economic crisis (a common refrain among Indian policy makers now) sidesteps the issue we are raising here.11 Since the 1980s, the neo-liberalization of global economy has produced a transformation towards a competitive market economy, a move that was propelled by developed countries (Harvey 2007). But it is precisely in the latter that the globalness of the current crisis originated and spread.12 If indeed we accept that macroeconomic outcomes are a result of agents’ decision-action in a competitive market economy, then surely it is that economy which must be held accountable for the outcome. In other words, instead of the fundamentals of microeconomics being good, they must be seen as deeply problematical and could be held as containing seeds of instability and destruction at a broader level.

The above underscores that microeconomic environment constituted by the competitive market economy populated by free agents can and does produce economic and social disasters, as it has; far from being self-regulating, markets may produce, as it has, self-annihilation leaving people, regions and even nations struggling to survive. Therefore, not only do we get the insufficiency of the neoliberal qua neoclassical framework in locating and explaining depression (as we argued earlier), but we additionally also find its chief logical conduit of explaining the functioning of economic system faltering. Surely, there is something wrong with this microeconomic environment which in turn calls for a rethinking of the basic economic system itself, the way production, distribution and consumption of goods and services materialize under capitalist form. One the other hand, if one still maintains that microeconomic fundamentals are sound, then one will have to concede that there is a dissonance between micro and macro, that macro economy has relative autonomy including possibilities of structural failure. This realization entails the role of state including active policy ones pertaining to control of the economy, if prevention of economic crisis or disaster (or, what Lucas called depression) is considered as desirable objective. Perhaps, the current economic crisis in India shows that both the aspects are true: there is a problem with the basic economic system produced by global capitalism functioning through a competitive market economy and that a role of the state as an active and intervening player in the economy is necessitated. The importance of the first was argued for by Marx whereby he related the macroeconomic crisis (the crisis of capitalism as such) to the contradiction, convulsion and failure of the competitive market economy functioning through capitalist organization of surplus and suggested the abortion of capitalism as a recipe for resolving the macro crisis. He thus favoured a systemic transformation. The second issue was taken up by Keynes when he suggested the role of the state in overcoming recession and ensuring smoothening of business cycles by actively intervening in and influencing the market economic outcomes, a point we saw was fiercely opposed by Lucas and his acolytes. This also shows that while both Marx and Keynes appreciated the relation between macro and micro (albeit in very different ways), Marx argued that systemic instability and disaster cannot be averted except by replacing capitalism as a system and Keynes suggested that the same can be averted, that is, capitalism saved with the active role of state preventing business cycles from turning into possible depression. Not surprising, neoliberalism as an economic-politico philosophy is not just hostile to Marxism, but also to Keynesianism (even as Keynes’ objective was to save capitalism).  Leaving aside their differences, it is perhaps more pertinent to realize that the current economic crisis has demonstrated that the suggestions of both Marx and Keynes, in tandem, need to be taken seriously. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s allusion to strong microeconomic fundamentals which is tantamount to taking the competitive market economy as sacrosanct that in turn demands a thin role of state, it is perhaps time to seriously question this conjecture and begin a debate on both the nature of economic system and state; to debate them not distinctly, but in tandem as in overdetermination. It is my position that in the current climate of India, this is not happening, either from the Right or Left.

Conclusion

Policy paralysis appears in a different way here. The policy paralysis is a paralysis of thinking that shuts out any solution other than what is the ‘consensus.’ Competitive market economy with capitalist appropriation and distribution of surplus in a global setting is the consensus in this historical episode that, however, also continues to burden us with a growing set of changes or ‘reforms’ that deepen the very processes and system which are responsible for this crisis. How and in what manner these so-called ‘reforms’ are going to put the Indian economy back on track are issues not touched upon? How they are going to put some sanity into our present unstable and volatile systemic regime is left untouched? Indeed, in a scenario where the malaise is systemic encompassing both the micro and macro, it is hardly surprisingly that the policies are not working. The debate from the radical side is disturbing too, being stuck on the need for the enhanced role of state which is, at times, combined with the nationalist trope of self-reliance. There is hardly any questioning of, and debate on, the issue of systemic transformation and the politics of producing it. Well, we have moved from a state sponsored development paradigm to a private market economy driven paradigm, and found both to be wanting. Changing the role of state (say moving towards a strong state) without challenging the economic system is unsustainable as history has shown us; in fact, both must be addressed together. To put it somewhat differently, both the micro and macro, in tandem, must be made the object of questioning and transformation.

Anjan Chakrabarti is Professor of Economics, Calcutta University. He can be reached at chakanjan@hotmail.com.

 

References

Chakrabarti, A and Dhar, A. 2009. Dislocation and Resettlement in Development: From Third World to World of the Third. Routledge: London.

Chakrabarti, A and A.K. Dhar. 2012. “Gravel in the Shoe: Nationalism and World of the Third,” Rethinking Marxism, 24 (1).

Chakrabarti A, A.K. Dhar and Cullenberg, S. 2012. Global Capitalism and World of the Third. World View Press: New Delhi.

Harvey, D. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, USA

Lucas, Robert, JR. 1976. “Econometric policy evaluation: A critique”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1 (1): 19-46.

Lucas, Robert, JR. 2003. “Macroeconomics Priorities”, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No.1.

Resnick, S. and R, Wolff. 2010. “The Economic Crisis: A Marxian Interpretation”, Rethinking Marxism, 22(2).

 

NOTES
——————————————————————————–

[1] Under mainstream economics, Microeconomics is the study of choices of individual decision-makers (not matter how large) to fulfil their wants (satisfaction or profit) in the face of scarcity of resources, while Macroeconomics is the study of economic aggregates intending to capture the overall health and behaviour of entire economy (no matter how small). In the former, the emphasis moves to resource allocation and income distribution which in case of the latter is on economic growth, inflation and unemployment.

[2] Our usage of the terms such as circuits or camp of global capital and world of the third follows the theoretical insights of Chakrabarti, Dhar and Cullenberg (2012) and Chakrabarti and Dhar (2009, 2012) who produce a unique frame to analyse the historical phenomenon of modernization in the Southern setting. In the context of our current issue, these terms can be roughly put in the following way. Following liberalization policies in India, spurred by its wide industrial base (paradoxically, a gift of its previous import substitution policy) and fairly advanced higher education system (also paradoxically courtesy of its erstwhile planning system), Indian industries, particularly the big business houses, gradually adjusted to the rules and demands of global competition and, along with new enterprises, mutated into global capitalist enterprises. Through outsourcing and sub-contracting, they forged relation with local enterprises procreating and circumscribed within a nation’s border (the local market) and with enterprises outside the nation’s border (the global market); it is the symbiotic relation through local-global market that allowed the formation of circuits. Specifically, via the local-global market, global capital was linked to the ancillary local enterprises (big and small scale, local capitalist and non-capitalist) and other institutions (banking enterprise, trading enterprise, transport enterprise, etc.) and together they formed the circuits of global capital. Rapid growth of Indian economy propelled by the expansion of the circuits of global capital (inclusive of manufacturing and services) is feeding an explosive process of urbanization, and producing along the way a culture of individualization and consumerism. It is being complemented by new-fangled notions of success, entrepreneurship and consumerism, of ways of judging performance and conduct, of changing gender and caste relations, customs and mores, etc. Resultantly, what appears is a social cluster of practices, activities and relationships capturing literally the production of an encampment: we name it as the camp of global capital. This camp, especially its hub, is becoming the nursery ground of a new nationalist culture bent on dismantling extant meanings of good life in India and replacing it with the tooth and claw model that emphasizes competition, possession and accumulation. We refer to circuits-camp of global capital as global capitalism. Evidently, in the formation, global capital is taken as the privileged centre.

World of the third, on the other hand, is conceptualized as an overdetermined space of capitalist and non-capitalist class processes that procreate outside the circuits of global capital. A large number of these ‘non-capitalist’ class processes are independent, feudal, communitic, slave and communist as also capitalist class enterprises of simple reproduction type. World of the third is thus a space that is conceptually never part of global negotiations; it is outside, if we may borrow a term from Gayatri Spivak Chakravarty, the Empire-Nation exchange, which refers to exchanges within the local-global market connected to the circuits of global capital. In short, world of the third embrace an overdetermined cluster of class and non-class processes procreating outside the circuits of global capital and are knotted to markets as well as to non-market exchanges. Social cluster of practices, activities and relationships connected to the language-experience-logic-ethos of this space constitutes the camp of world of the third. It may be recalled that what for us is world of the third is for modernist discourses (like colonialism, development, and so on) third world: this is the Orientalist moment through which the modern emerges as the privileged centre. Third world supposedly contains inefficient practices and activities; as nurturing excess labour, labour that is presumed to be unproductive and hence a burden on society; as harbouring a large reserve army of the unemployed/underemployed. In short, it is re-presented as a figure of lack. The foregrounding of category of third world then provides an angularity to world of the third thereby foreclosing its language-experience-ethos-logic and discursively producing a deformation of its practices, activities and relationships. One does not get to appreciate the possibility of an outside to the circuits of global capital; one thus loses sight of the world of the third. Instead, what awaits us is a devalued space, a lacking underside – third world – that needs to be transgressed–transformed–mutilated-included. Thus, world of the third is brought into the discursive register and worked upon, but without taking cognizance of its language-logic-experience-ethos. Critically, this foreclosure of world of the third through the foregrounding of third world (or, by substitute signifiers such as social capital, community, etc.) helps secure and facilitate the hegemony of (global) capital and modernity over world of the third. Taken together, a knowledge formation emerges in which global capital and modern emerges as the privileged centres. Chakrabarti et al unravels and critiques this knowledge formation and through the return of the foreclosed world of the third lays down the contour of a contesting way to theorize the Southern context.    

[3] Chakrabarti and Dhar (2009).

[4] Chakrabarti and Dhar (2012).

[5] On being quizzed as to whether India’s integration into global economy has made it more prone to shocks and instabilities, a friend of mine holding a senior position in a financial institution suggested a few years back that one reason why competitive market economy is good is because it enhances the ability of the economic system to absorb and internalize shocks; this is by no means a very uncommon refrain, at least till a few years ago. In short, breakdowns can never happen. I wonder what he has to say now.

[6] Of course, as we have seen, the question of ‘who is exactly becoming richer or becoming richer much faster than others’ has raised a few hackles and is on its own a question of some importance.

[7] Unlike a robust state (of command economies or welfare capitalism) which believes in ‘more governance is good governance’, neoliberalism believes in, at the level of political philosophy at least, ‘less governance is good governance.’ Of course, given the astonishing quantum of plunder, violence and destruction produced in the name of ‘freedom’ that is neoliberal in nature, one must take this refrain with a grain of salt. But then we are discussing its logical conduit here.

[8] It is notable that macroeconomics not only originated in the West, but its central problem is fundamentally that of the modern market economy as well. USA and Europe have been the theatre of macroeconomics and developments there influenced the macroeconomics discipline and the policy paradigm of state not only in Europe but all over the world. In this sense, macroeconomics has been imperial in nature or should we say it is an indispensable component of any imperialist policies bent on modernization. Interestingly, three episodes of systemic breakdown or depression produced three turns in macroeconomics in the West that in turn enforced a switch in macroeconomic understanding and management across the world. The first was the depression of the 1930s that saw the collapse of the classical paradigm (emphasizing the dichotomy between nominal variables such as money and real variables such as output) which disparaged state intervention; this collapse saw the concurrent rise of Keynesianism (emphasizing that the classical dichotomy is wrong, at least in the short run) which maintained that state intervention and active stabilization policy is necessary to prevent depression and this could be done since there is a tradeoff between inflation rate and unemployment and between unemployment and output. The second episode of depression was marked by stagflation in USA (high inflation and stagnating output) in the late 1960s which even in the face of active stabilization policy to exploit the mentioned trade off failed to get the economy out of depression; this failure of stabilization policies saw the collapse of Keynesian economics and the rise of supply side or new classical economics that once again reiterated the classical dichotomy and the inherent inability of the state to improve welfare in the face of active and enterprising individuals. It was shown that not only did the state led stabilization policy fail to improve the welfare, but also that such interventions created inefficiencies of all kinds. Important in this attack was the paper of Lucas (1976) that showed that there is something methodologically wrong in the way Keynesianism poses its own macroeconomic structure; it does so, he claims, by treating the individuals as docile, passive who would not react to changes in the stabilization policies, precisely what the liberals have condemned as contravening the principle of freedom. Arguing that it is fundamentally wrong to treat the individuals as bereft of agency, he showed that with the introduction of stabilization policies, rather than being passive to the changes brought about by the state, the agents will internalize that information and change their behaviour which in totally will produce an outcome very different from (and inferior to) the case in which it is presumed (as under Keynesianism) that individuals behaviour will remain invariant to change in policies. The Keynesians, contrary to what the liberals would emphasize, took the structure as primary and tried to fit in the individual to this structure (the attempt of what came to known as Keynesian-neoclassical synthesis) when the liberal economists such as Lucas and Edward Prescott were emphasizing the method to be the other way round: individual was to be the primary unit from which the structure is to be derived; not surprisingly then, for the neoliberal economists (the new classical/real business cycle school) the neoclassical micro structure became that fundamental ground and (macro)economy was the derived general equilibrium structure over which macroeconomic analysis and policies are to be examined. The invariance principle and inability to posit the microfoundation of macroeconomics constituted the basis on which Keynesian macroeconomics was attacked and the stabilization role of state found wanting; the macroeconomics that developed through this attack and reconstruction via microfoundation become the missile head of neoliberalism in the field of economics and policy making. The third episode of systemic crisis or depression is the global economic crash since 2007 which has turned the table on neoliberal macroeconomics which has claimed that it has solved the problem of depression by legitimizing the creation of a competitive market economy made of private players and in which stabilization policy of state is not encouraged; a systemic crisis that rose not because of state or any third party intervention (since, in the last three decades they were heavily discouraged) but through the very mechanics of the private competitive market economy certainly did not do the reputation of neoliberal macroeconomics any good. What will come out of this crisis in the field of macroeconomics is yet to be seen though no doubt it has exploded the myth of the fundamental proposition of neo-liberal macroeconomics. As it stands now, macroeconomics lie in tatters.

[9] In modern macroeconomics, general equilibrium is after all the point of reference and departure (even in case of New Keynesian economics where markets are shown to be failing to clear as a result of the behaviour of agents in a free market environment).

[10] Micro and Macro divisions are typical of mainstream economics and not of Marx or Marxism. Accepting the importance of not reading or writing on Marx by reducing him to this structure, in this presentation at least, we invoke Marx with reference to this division of micro and macro for the sake of organization that includes an encounter with neoclassical economics. Rather than reducing Marx to neoclassical economics, it is to highlight the uniqueness of Marx’s contribution.

[11] This comes on top of the fact that this blaming is hardly stopping the policy makers from taking ‘reform’ policies that deepen India’s integration into the global economy and hence, by their own confession, must be taken as increasing the possibilities of transporting global crisis into Indian economy. In other words, the ammunition that they are supplying with the intent to overcome the crisis may end up deepening it. At least, the policy makers need to spell out clearly as to why this would not happen.

[12] For a superb analysis of US economic crisis, see Resnick and Wolff (2010).

http://radicalnotes.com/2012/10/25/the-faltering-miracle-story-of-india/

What’s in a NaMo? A troubling cult-Harish Khare

Posted by admin On October - 28 - 2012 Comments Off

Narendra Modi’s authoritarian model of leadership is a threat to the BJP, the RSS and India

In our puerile preoccupation with the antics of a self-anointed corruption-buster, not enough attention has been paid to a truly disturbing development in Gujarat. That blessed State now has a new television channel named NaMO, a favourite sobriquet for the “leader,” Narendra Modi. This is perhaps the first instance of a leader outside Tamil Nadu getting a channel named after him. But the difference is that while the AIADMK, the DMK and the DMDK — whose leaders have television channels named after them — are regional outfits, Mr. Modi belongs, at least putatively, to a national party.

It is not known whether the BJP’s central leadership was consulted in the Gujarat party channel’s naamsanskaran, but we do know that the saffron party has for over three decades taken a principled stand against all manifestations of “personality cult”, a weakness its leaders so damningly attributed to the Congress during the heyday of Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi. Now there is quiet acquiescence in Mr. Modi’s insistently personalised claims.

Tip of the iceberg
The new channel is only the tip of the iceberg. Disquietingly enough, the BJP and its apologists remain untroubled over the in-your-face authoritarian formulations and posturing by the Gujarat Chief Minister. Rather, the inclination is to concede his every single demand or fancy, because he is deemed to be an “achiever”, a man who has “transformed” Gujarat and a man who “delivers” electorally. And, we are now being tempted with the relevance-of-the-Gujarat-model-for-the-entire-country thesis.

Essentially Mr. Modi and his authoritarian model of leadership are first and foremost a threat to the BJP as well as the sangh parivar. The harsh reality is that the Chief Minister has garnered sufficient electoral, monetary, political and administrative clout to declare a kind of functional independence from the national leadership and its legitimate control; rather, important central leaders are dependent on him to get into the national legislature.

It is now a matter of historical record how, after the 2002 massacre, the Gujarat Chief Minister was able to mobilise sentiments in the BJP against the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his exhortation to Mr. Modi to observe the rites of rajdharma. Since then, the party has continuously found itself trapped in Mr. Modi’s communal leadership format. And though the Chief Minister has assiduously sought to suggest that he has moved on to a “development agenda”, there can be no confusion that at the very core Mr. Modi has wilfully marketed himself as a deeply divisive personality, unafraid to summon the instruments and rhetoric of violence. This subtle but essentially authoritarian promise of violence remains the defining feature of Mr. Modi’s so-called “Gujarat model.”

The BJP central leadership finds itself in a bind. It has for long fashioned itself as the embodiment of an alternative political culture and has denounced the Congress party’s stifling “high command” style; unlike the Congress, the BJP has talked itself into encouraging “strong” regional leaders but eventually found it necessary to tame State-level satraps who grew too big for their boots — be it a Kalyan Singh in Uttar Pradesh or Yeddyurappa in Karnataka. Mr. Modi now presents a new test. The uncertain and confused leaders holding court at 11, Ashoka Road, are confronted with Mr. Modi’s “my way or the high way” choice. These mealy-mouthed leaders have already subscribed to Mr. Modi’s “Gujarat asmita” mantra, as if the State enjoyed a special status like Nagaland or Jammu and Kashmir. However, if the BJP wants to be taken seriously as a national party, with a central leadership capable of arbitrating morals and manners among its country-wide rank and file, then it would be interesting to see how it resists a hostile takeover bid from the Modi corner.

Today, the Gujarat BJP is unquestionably Mr. Modi’s pocket-borough. He brooks no challenge to his leadership, his authoritative choices and preferences prevail down to the taluka level. No party leader or activist can prosper without the Chief Minister’s blessings. His Cabinet colleagues have been reduced to the status of glorified clerks. In the so-called “development model”, the Chief Minister relies on the district level administrative machinery to collect huge crowds, which helps in manufacturing the illusion of a mass following. A leader has emerged bigger than the organisation. And that cannot be very comforting to any democratic soul.

Mr. Modi’s supreme authority has prospered not just at the expense of the BJP; the sangh parivar too should have reason to worry. The RSS brass will ponder over the fact that today all its frontal organisations — the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad — have reason to feel marginalised and humiliated by an over-bearing Chief Minister.

But all this is between the CM and his party and the sangh parivar. What ought to be a cause for concern to democratic India is the effortless manner in which Mr. Modi has acquired a monopoly over political truth, a basic requisite in an incipient authoritarian show. Any individual or group that dares to question the Chief Minister and his ways has been rendered illegitimate and inimical to Gujarat. Dissent has been virtually shut out of Gujarat’s democratic marketplace.

Recently when that grand old man of the milk revolution in India, Verghese Kurien, died, newspapers recalled a January 2004 confrontation between the Amul Man and Mr. Modi. The two had shared a platform at Anand, Mr. Kurien’s karambhoomi. The Milk Man gathered the courage to tell the Chief Minister that the 2002 communal violence had brought a bad name to the State and narrated the adverse observations of a visiting Japanese dignitary. According to newspaper reports, Mr. Modi bluntly ticked Mr. Kurien off: “After years of suppression, we have got into the habit of taking certificates from foreigners. Should we be taking certificate from this lady in Japan who came here only for a few days?” It was vintage Modi, massaging Gujarati sub-nationalism. (Soon Mr. Kurien found himself at the receiving end of the Chief Minister’s anger.)

A few months ago, the same Mr. Modi was in Japan. Soon his propaganda machinery was flaunting certificates to his “visionary leadership” from obscure Japanese functionaries, just as a visit from a British envoy has been tom-tommed as a massive endorsement of the Chief Minister’s “accomplishments”.

Like an old fashioned authoritarian, Mr. Modi has seen to it that he alone has the licence to speak for Gujarat. Admittedly, he cannot be blamed for aggressively dominating the discourse in Gujarat. His political foes within and outside the BJP have failed to come up with a rival imagination, and other voices have become feeble and ineffective. And, the Chief Minister has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for politics as theatre, using government resources to stage massive spectacles like Vibrant Gujarat Investment Melas, Sadbhavana Uppvas, Vivekananada yatras, etc. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether under Mr. Modi’s supposedly dynamic leadership, the BJP can better the Congress record of winning more than 140 Assembly seats.

‘Strongman’ offer
Gujarat may have nicely got used to the miasma of soft authoritarianism but must the rest of India buy into this thinly disguised “strongman” offer? Mr. Modi’s handlers and apologists can be expected to merchandise him as the perfect practitioner of noble “will power”, a decisive and seemingly incorruptible leader who will shepherd the country out of the current spell of indecision and drift. The gullible middle classes and sections of the media have already shown a remarkable appetite for the vendors of unorthodox solutions, like the handing over of Gestapo-like powers to some kind of a Lok Pal. Mercifully, there is only small hurdle that Mr. Modi may face in hawking his brand of ‘maha adhinayakvaad’, or cult of the great leader: in these last eight years, India has come to cherish its pluralistic values and democratic habits too much to fall for offers of leadership from would be “strongmen”. L.K. Advani found this out in 2009.

(Harish Khare is a veteran commentator and political analyst.)

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/whats-in-a-namo-a-troubling-cult/article4035463.ece?homepage=true

Toward an India-Pakistan Détente-Bruce Riedel

Posted by admin On October - 27 - 2012 Comments Off

With little attention outside South Asia, Indian and Pakistani leaders have moved to gradually improve trade and transportation links this year, despite the still-bitter wounds of the 2008 Mumbai terror attack. America’s next president should seek to encourage this process, a rare good-news story that may help transform the subcontinent.

President Zardari traveled to India in April. Since then, economic delegations have gone back and forth, and a deal easing visa restrictions has been signed. There is talk of opening up huge amounts of Indian direct investment in Pakistan. Congress leader Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Singh are said to back increasing trade with Islamabad. In the past, efforts to encourage free trade usually get bogged down in bureaucratic red tape. Talk about a South Asia free-trade zone is a perennial staple of regional summits, but in reality there is little trade between the subcontinent’s two biggest countries.

Increased trade and transit would build constituencies in both countries that support an end to conflict and favor peace. Unleashing the economic potential of a unified South Asian market could do for Pakistan, India and their neighbors what the European Union did for Europe, re-creating a common sense of identity and self interest. Tourism between the two big states could build a level of understanding and familiarity that would be healthy. It could reunite what partition broke apart, a subcontinent of peace—not war.

Today, direct trade between the two nations is relatively small. The total trade between Pakistan and India in 2011 was $2.6 billion. In 2010, India exported about $2 billion to Pakistan and imported about $300 million. This is twice the amount in 2006 and almost ten times larger than 2001, but it’s still fairly small. The Economist estimates that bilateral trade would grow tenfold to $25 billion a year if all trade barriers were removed. Indirect trade (usually via Dubai or Singapore) is much greater but very hard to quantify. Air flights between the cities of India and Pakistan are rare. It is usually easier to travel via a third nation such as the UAE.

Both governments’ intelligence and security services scrutinize visitors from the other side with an assumption that they are up to no good and should be watched carefully or, better, kept out. Nonetheless, modest but important progress has been made in the last year. Most recently, in September the two countries signed an agreement to ease visa requirements: children under twelve years old and adults over sixty-five will not need a visa. But Prime Minister Singh made clear that the Mumbai masterminds must be brought to justice for a greater loosening to occur in travel requirements.

There is certainly much interest in India in more trade and transit. Successive Indian governments, both Congress and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, have talked about more economic interaction and freer trade. Prime Minister Singh famously dreamed once in public about a day in which he could breakfast in New Delhi, lunch in Lahore and dine in Kabul. India in August 2012 unilaterally decided to allow direct foreign investment from Pakistan in India, which one expert has called a “huge psychological blow to elements hostile to improved ties.”

Traditionally there was much less Pakistani interest in trade with India, but now it is growing. Pakistani finance minister Abdul Hafeez Shaikh told a Brookings audience in June 2012 that when he was asked in the past how to improve Pakistan’s economic prospects, he facetiously advocated moving the whole country to the Alps and becoming part of the European Union. Now he said he realizes the Himalayas are really the better venue since Pakistan is superbly positioned next to the two fastest-growing economies in the world, India and China.

But Shaikh may still be in the minority in Pakistan, where many still fear India as a partner. Some worry the larger Indian economy will swamp Pakistan with cheap products. Others fear it will make Pakistan dependent on India. Those who are the most hawkish on India, of course, oppose more trade, considering it dealing with the enemy. The army traditionally has been very skeptical of improved trade, transit and communications. But it may be rethinking the issue since the army owns many business ventures, including the largest highway-construction company.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of the Mumbai massacre, has in 2012 organized massive demonstrations in Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad against trade with India and relations with the United States. LeT is prepared to go further. A key operative with the nom de guerre Abu Jindal was captured in Saudi Arabia this summer plotting a major new attack on India. Now he has been extradited to New Delhi.

America helped catch Abu Jindal, but is not a central player in the bigger picture. But Washington does have an interest in the success of this nascent rapprochement. Whoever wins in November should put U.S. diplomacy and entrepreneurship behind an economic integration of the subcontinent. Neither President Obama nor Governor Romney mentioned India in their foreign-policy debate, but both should have it very much on the mind if they win.

Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. A career CIA officer, he has advised four presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues on the staff of the National Security Council.

http://nationalinterest.org/article/toward-india-pakistan-detente-7667?page=show

The Queen and her unwritten writ-Arvind Sivaramakrishnan

Posted by admin On October - 9 - 2012 Comments Off

The monarch’s question to a minister on Abu Hamza may be unconstitutional but the issues it raises cannot be solved because the U.K. has no written Constitution

The BBC has received some predictably unwelcome publicity about the revelations by its security correspondent Frank Gardner, live on the flagship Radio 4 news programme Today, that the Queen had said, at a private occasion in 2008, that she could not understand why the radical Islamic preacher Abu Hamza had not been arrested and that she had approached a minister asking why he was still at large. The Corporation has tendered an apology to the Queen for breaching a convention that whatever the monarch says outside occasions of state is off the record, but the fact that the Queen expressed her opinion to a minister could be a breach of the constitutional settlement of 1688, under which the monarchs were allowed to keep their respective heads but Parliament took, and has since kept, legislative sovereignty. The Queen’s question to the minister might count as unconstitutional lobbying for an action or a policy, but the issues raised are almost insoluble because the United Kingdom has no codified Constitution.

Complicated separation
There has, therefore, never been an uncomplicated separation between the monarch and the executive. When Queen Victoria’s Whig Prime Minister and royal favourite Lord Melbourne resigned in 1839 following a defeat in the House of Commons, Victoria refused the incoming Tory Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel’s request that the monarch, in accordance with convention, replace her Whig ladies of the bedchamber with Tory ladies. Peel resigned over the snub, and Melbourne and the Whigs returned to office. In 1851, having failed a year earlier to get the Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, sacked, Victoria took advantage of the latter’s congratulatory message to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte on his coup in France to ask Prime Minister Lord John Russell to remove Palmerston, which he did.

The present Queen certainly takes what happens in government very seriously. Her schedule includes reading up to 10 boxes of Cabinet and other government papers daily, and she receives up to 60 ambassadors’ and high commissioners’ telegrams twice a day; she also grants the serving Prime Minister a weekly audience, which can last over an hour. Yet, while her aides express great admiration for her commitment and energy, not all observers agree that she has no impact on government. As head of state, the Queen ratifies a large number of nominations for high appointments, such as senior judicial posts, bishoprics, colonelships of regiments, certain chairs at the older universities, and national honours, several of which also refer to a long-extinct British Empire; in addition, many other honours are exclusively in the monarch’s gift.

Inevitably, many of those who covet such things, such as ex-politicians, civil servants, high military officers, and bishops, feel they have to act in ways they think will not displease the monarch; this could be particularly important in respect of honours which only the monarch can bestow, though most aspirants’ conduct may in practice have more impact on how they are viewed by those who make the nominations, such as the Prime Minister or other Ministers, than they do on the Queen herself.

Equally inevitably, this assemblage of conventions, purportedly traditional customs, and tacit understandings is often criticised. Opponents, including those who want the monarchy abolished, contend that the Queen herself has lobbied for policies, for example by talking at length with the then Prime Minister Tony Blair before a bill to outlaw hunting with dogs was put to Parliament in 2004 and telling him that ordinary people as well as social elites hunt with dogs. The House of Commons later passed the bill, a Labour Party manifesto commitment, but the Speaker then had to override the unelected House of Lords by invoking the Parliament Acts of 1911, and 1949, with the latter implying the Salisbury-Addison doctrine, a convention whereby the upper chamber does not block legislation enacting the ruling party’s manifesto promises.

Several Labour Party members and followers have further reason to be suspicious of the current monarch’s loyalties. In February 1974, an inconclusive election produced no outright winner but gave Labour 301 seats to the Conservatives’ 297, and yet the incumbent Prime Minister and Conservative leader Edward Heath tried to form a government over the next few days; some Labour supporters were very angry that the Queen had not immediately invited the Labour leader Harold Wilson to Buckingham Palace to give him that task, and saw the delay as confirming a monarchical preference for the Conservatives. It is, in addition, only a convention that the invitation to form a government goes to the leader of the party that wins an election; in theory, the Queen can appoint any of her subjects Prime Minister.

The Queen is not the only current royal to have attracted this kind of criticism, and Prince Charles in particular is sometimes very explicit about policies he favours. The heir to the throne is said to have infuriated Mr. Blair by opposing genetically modified food; he has also had discussions with the current Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, and Education Minister Michael Gove.

Jumble of statutes
While secret exchanges between the monarch, or her family, and the executive might — perhaps casuistically — be described as fulfilling a royal desire to be informed about the issues of the day, the fact that the British Constitution is uncodified makes it almost impossible even to decide what is or is not constitutionally correct, or who has the authority to rule on it. As the former senior Labour MP Tony Wright has said, there is only a jumble of statutes, common law, customs, and guidebooks; moreover, apparently constitutional laws have no special status, and can be repealed by an ordinary vote in Parliament.

That in turn means the system contains some utterly arbitrary elements. The pressure group Republic, for example, is scathing about the monarch’s power to dismiss a government at any time for any or no reason; in 1975, the Queen’s appointed representative in Australia, the Governor-General, did just that, and ended the political career of the then Prime Minister, Labour’s Gough Whitlam. The Canadian Governor-General also used this power in 2008, proroguing the dominion’s Parliament for several weeks.

Prerogative powers
Republic also criticises the royal prerogative powers, which are vested in the British government, and are effectively beyond scrutiny or restraint by Parliament. The most notorious prerogative is the power to declare war, which Mr. Blair used for the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003; he did allow the House of Commons a vote on the war, but the opposition Conservatives’ overwhelming vote in favour meant that the combined vote for a negating amendment by 139 Labour rebels and all the Liberal Democrats was easily defeated. In any case the prerogative power meant that Mr. Blair would have been under no obligation to resign if he had lost the vote, and certainly under no obligation to cancel the invasion.

Partly as a result, demands arose for publication of the prerogative powers, but Mr. Blair’s government resisted, and then published only a partial list. The powers include recognising foreign states, and also keeping the peace within the realm, which a court decision has confirmed include ministerial powers to issue baton rounds to police without the consent of the given force’s local authority.

If any wider picture emerges from this tangle, it is the remoteness of the electorate from major decisions on policy and legislation. Rights lawyer Andrew Puddephatt has said that the 1688 settlement was a carve-up between the monarch and Parliament. Such rights as then emerged had only to do with the assembly’s rights in relation to the monarchy; since then, party discipline in the Commons has rendered even Parliament progressively more remote from the key decisions. As for Abu Hamza, Vikram Dodd notes in the Guardian that when tried in the U.K. in 2005-6, the cleric told the court of his long contact with the British security services, who had told him his fiery sermons were all right “as long as we don’t see blood on the streets.” According to a secret service infiltrator he was a useful if unwitting source of information on other extremists, even though British Muslims who reject extremism were already giving the authorities information of their own accord. Perhaps Her Majesty could have avoided a possible constitutional impropriety by asking the right officials why Abu Hamza was allowed to remain in her realm.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-queen-and-her-unwritten-writ/article3978721.ece?homepage=true

I am an inqilabi (revolutionary) — Dr Mubashir Hasan

Posted by admin On October - 8 - 2012 Comments Off

As a poor inqilabi worker, I have no means to overthrow the unjust order. I am too poor to build organisations

I am an inqilabi (revolutionary). I am a hari kissan (tenant farmer) in the fields, a labourer in industrial plants, a railway man, a postal worker, a schoolteacher, an office clerk, a chowkidar (guard), a police constable, a clerk in a court of law and in uncounted large number of other jobs.

I work in a factory in Dera Ghazi Khan. The owner of the factory is among the top richest men in the continent. I do not understand why he wants to be among the top richest men in the continent. Why is he not satisfied to be the richest man in Pakistan or the Punjab province or even the district Dera Ghazi Khan? I am concerned because he has become rich by paying me the lowest possible wage. His cost of production is much lower than the money he makes by selling the product I make for him. He usurps for himself and his partners the surplus and becomes richer and richer. I resent it but then I realise what else can he do? Indeed, he deserves to be congratulated for being the one of the most efficient operators of the unjust economic system we have in the country.

Because I am poor, I have to go before a rich person to get a job or work. The zamindar (landlord) allows me to work on a piece of his land on the condition that I give him the maximum possible share of the produce, which means I keep the lowest possible share for myself and my family. In other words, I remain as poor as possible, barely enough to eat with no money left for the education of my children, their healthcare expenses and for other essential requirements of life.

Government, the courts, industrialists, businessmen, in fact, all employers of poor men and women in Pakistan have established an unjust labour market to ensure the supply of poor men and women at the lowest possible rates. The blackmailing of the poor people, forcing them to work for the lowest possible wage, or starve, guarantees that the poor in Pakistan shall remain poor forever while the rich will become richer.

As the lowest paid working inqilabi, under duress I have often pondered what stands in the way of the poor becoming rich or at least half as rich as our middle-income classes. I have come to the conclusion that it is the state of Pakistan that stands in my way to earn a decent living. Whenever my colleagues and I gather and demonstrate before a factory to secure an increase in wages, the police come out to beat us up. If we resist the police, it fires tear gas shells and brings water cannons to drive us away and during the night arrests our leaders. And more, who can forget how Ziaul Haq’s police opened fire and killed 17 workers in a factory at Multan. Now that is not fair. Does the government exist only to favour the rich?

The answer is, yes. We are told that government forces perpetrate violence on us because we act against the law. Therefore, it is clear that government has made no law against the rich becoming richer and has made no law to prevent the employer to make us live an inhuman life by not paying us more. The perpetuation of unjust inequality between the rich and the poor by legal means sounds peculiar until you consider who makes the laws.

Our law-making legislatures are overcrowded by the rich. A few months ago, Pildat released a report saying that the average wealth of a member of parliament is $ 1,000,000, nearly Rs 100,000,000. I cannot possibly expect from our legislature that it would make laws to make the rich less rich and the poor less poor. I am destined to remain poor as my father and grandfather were destined as long as the legislatures stay as they are, full of the rich, my exploiters, the looters of the wealth I produce for them.

As a poor inqilabi worker, I have no means to overthrow the unjust order. I am too poor to build organisations. As I see things, my oppressor is powerful beyond imagination. He has organised bands of law enforcers with guns, tear gas, intelligence networks and communication facilities. Thus, I use the only weapon I have. Going slow is my policy, my weapon. On a job, I produce as little as possible to make vacancies for others like me. All my colleagues do the same. Do not I know that the more we produce for our employer the more rich and powerful he would become? All of us go slow — the police, the tax collector, and the courts. By not working hard during the last 65 years, we have succeeded in tearing down the state structure. I am proud of my achievement. No more is there a government in Pakistan with enough authority to enforce its writ. I am freer today than ever before to live as I want to without caring for the law or rules. I am grateful and thank all intellectuals and educated people who unendingly write and speak about my plight and wrangle theories about poverty. I know that a small number of them work for the intelligence community or American and other imperialists and work against my interests, but I am convinced that a large number is genuinely devoted to the cause of the poor. I fervently hope that one day they will come out on the street to organise and lead the poor and the downtrodden into a force capable of changing the system in favour of the poor and against the rich and powerful.

The writer can be reached at mh1@lhr.comsats.net.pk
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\10\08\story_8-10-2012_pg3_3

Behind Robert Vadra’s fortune, a maze of questions-Shalini Singh

Posted by admin On October - 8 - 2012 Comments Off

Property empire was built on soft loans handed out in unusual circumstances, documents show

In February, as rumours of the ambitions of Congress president Sonia Gandhi’s son-in-law swirled amidst the heat and dust of the election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, her daughter Priyanka moved to scotch speculation about Robert Vadra’s possible political future.

“He’s a successful businessman,” the younger Ms. Gandhi said of her husband, “who is not interested in changing his occupation.”

Even though Mr. Vadra has increasingly emerged in the public eye, there has been little information on just how successful a businessman he is — and how his empire was built.

Last year, The Economic Times first wrote about his “low-key entry into the real estate business” with the help of DLF Ltd, India’s largest commercial property developer. And on Friday, Arvind Kejriwal and Prashant Bhushan of India Against Corruption (IAC) released documents which showed how Mr. Vadra has acquired land assets in and around the National Capital Region worth hundreds of crores of rupees, sometimes at prices below market value — funded by interest-free loans disbursed to him by DLF and other companies for no apparent reason.

Though the documents reveal no illegality or impropriety on the part of Mr. Vadra, they do raise the question of why DLF — which is a publicly traded company — would enter into multiple business transactions with him on terms that appear highly preferential. The company on Saturday issued a lengthy press release setting out its side of the story but questions of corporate governance remain and minority shareholders are likely to ask the company for the rationale behind its arrangement with Ms. Sonia Gandhi’s son-in-law and whether similar soft loans (or “advances” as DLF prefers to call them) and deals have been transacted with companies owned by other prominent individuals. The answer to the second question may help explain why a normally feisty Opposition has been remarkably silent on the DLF-Vadra connection since the story first broke in 2011.

In 1997, the year Mr. Vadra married Priyanka Gandhi, he incorporated his first, modest business — Artex, which dealt with brass handicrafts and fashion accessories. From 2007, there was a surge in his activities. Inside of a year, he founded five other ventures, spanning the real estate, hospitality and trading sectors.

Ms. Gandhi maintained a distance from these companies: in 2008, she dissociated herself from the sole business in which she was involved, aircraft charter firm Blue Breeze Trading.

From balance sheets and directors’ reports released by IAC and additional papers obtained by The Hindu, which relate to six group companies, it is clear that Mr. Vadra’s rise was meteoric. In 2007-2008, his companies started out with promoter funds of just Rs. 50 lakh.

However, the companies succeeded in acquiring 29 high-value properties by 2010, armed with loans and advances of Rs. 80 crore from DLF,… as well as Bedarwals Infra Projects, Nikhil International and VRS Infrastructure. These included a Rs. 31.7 crore acquisition of a 50 per cent share of Saket Courtyard by 2010, armed with loans and advances of Rs. 80 crore from DLF, as well as Bedarwals Infra Projects, Nikhil International and VRS Infrastructure.

These included a Rs. 31.7 crore acquisition of a 50 per cent share of Saket Courtyard Hospitality, which owns the 114-bed Hilton Garden Hotel in New Delhi; a 10,000 square foot penthouse, number B1115, at the DLF Aralias complex for Rs 89.41 lakh; 7 apartments in DLF Magnolia for Rs. 5.2 crore; apartments for Rs. 5.06 crore at DLF Capital Greens; and a DLF-owned plot in Delhi’s ultra-posh Greater Kailash II area for Rs. 1.21 crore. Though DLF’s press release said some of these prices were “completely incorrect,” the investment numbers are all stated in the balance sheets filed by Mr. Vadra’s companies with the Registrar of Companies.

Then, at the end of 2010, Mr. Vadra’s companies also picked up a bouquet of rural properties: 160.62 acres of agricultural land in Bikaner for Rs. 1.02 crore, and Rs. 2.43 crore for an additional 5 parcels of land of unknown acreage; land at Manesar, on Delhi’s fringes, for Rs. 15.38 crore; land at Palwal for Rs. 42 lakh, land at Hayyatpur, in Gurgaon, for roughly Rs. 4 crore; land at Hasanpur for Rs. 76.07 lakh; land at Mewat for Rs. 95.42 lakh; unidentified agricultural land for Rs. 69.09 lakh; and two ‘other real estate bookings’ worth Rs. 9 lakh.

From just Rs. 7.95 crore in fiscal 2008, Vadra’s fixed assets and investments grew to Rs 17.18 crore in fiscal 2009, jumping a staggering 350 per cent in a single year to Rs 60.53 crore in fiscal 2010, the year in which most of these properties were acquired with promoter funds of just Rs. 50 lakh along with interest of Rs. 255.46 lakh earned on advances and loans and zero group activity or profitability.

Despite the high market value of these listed assets (properties), though, the declared investment portfolio in Mr. Vadra’s balance sheets remained a meagre Rs. 71 crore at the end of fiscal 2010 with accumulated group losses of Rs. 3 crore.

Mr. Vadra’s companies did not respond to e-mails sent by The Hindu seeking clarifications on the details of these transactions. In particular, it remains unclear why DLF and other major corporations would have made him large loans, since this is not in the nature of their business. Nor did Mr. Vadra’s companies have any apparent prior specialisation in real estate business.

Financial wizardry

The financial information available from the balance sheets and directors’ reports of Mr. Vadra’s companies — Sky Light Hospitality, Sky Light Realty, Blue Breeze Trading, Artex, Real Earth Estates and North India IT Parks — raise hard questions about what business it is they actually do, and how this business is conducted.

Each of the companies has 268, Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi, as its common address, and Mr. Vadra and his mother Maureen Vadra as directors. Mr. Vadra, the documents show, receives remuneration of Rs. 60 lakh per annum from just one company, Sky Light Realty. The payment, the company’s auditor states is “remuneration in excess of the limit prescribed under section 217 (2A) of the Companies Act, 1956 read with the Companies (Particulars of Employees) Rules 1975.”

There are no other employee costs in the books, either to his mother or to others. However, in the documents, both directors “place on record their deep sense of appreciation for the committed services of executives, staff and workers of the company.”

Strangely, while assets balloon in each subsequent balance sheet, there is no account of the corresponding enhancement of visible business activity. For example, the balance sheets raise a current liability of Rs. 50 crore against the Manesar land, though it was registered for just Rs.15.38 crore in the same financial year, defying all commercial and financial prudence and raising doubts about whether this was an income rather than a current liability.

A senior chartered accountant told The Hindu on condition of anonymity, given the individuals involved, that masking incomes as loans/current liabilities in this manner is an unorthodox accounting device. “Using short term funding of this kind to create long-term assets defies financial prudence as it constitutes a high business risk, unless they are not really ‘current liabilities’ and are not payable in the short term, which means they are nothing but incomes which have been disguised,” he said. Vadra’s auditors consistently overlook this in all six firms, while accounting firm Khurana & Khurana in its Auditors Report for Real Earth Estates Pvt. Ltd. for the year 2010, actually opts to gloss over this by stating: “Based on the information and explanation given to and on an overall examination of the balance sheet of the company, in our opinion, there are no funds raised on short term basis which have been used for long term investment.”

The auditor’s accounting rigor comes into further question with its statement that according to the information and explanations given to us, the company has, during the year, not granted any loans, secured or unsecured to companies, firm or other parties covered in the register maintained under section 31 of the Companies Act 1956, excepting the advances under business obligation accordingly paragraphs 4 (iii) (a) (b) (c) and (d) of the order are not applicable. However, the balance sheet shows loans and advances of Rs 2.89 crore for the company in 2010.

Many such loans, which reflect as total current liability of Rs. 72 crore in the accounts, are invested in long-term assets like land. Curiously, no one appears to be pressing for the return of these loans — which are, according to the documents, interest-free.

Additionally, all of Mr. Vadra’s companies show interest income from fixed deposits, claiming tax deducted at source for this interest without accounting for the fixed deposits themselves in the balance sheets. The six companies’ profitability, which grew from zero in 2007-8 to Rs. 20.94 lakh in 2008-9 to Rs. 255.46 lakh in 2009-10, was not from any business activity in these companies but purely from interest on 23 elusive fixed deposits amounting to roughly Rs. 5 crore.

There are other unexplained gaps in the financial information. As of March 31, 2010, the group profit and loss account shows that only Sky Light Realty made a profit, and that too in one single year. Yet, while the others show losses, they continue to make investments. This profit of Rs. 244.98 lakh was despite a complete absence of business activity or liquidation/reduction of fixed assets, investments or other bookings. However, the accumulated losses of Rs. 3 crore from the other 5 firms in the RV Group’s 2010 balance sheet wipe out Vadra’s capital and reserves, raising questions about his ability to buy so many high value properties with zero capital.

DLF’s fortunes

Perhaps the key to the relationship could lie in DLF’s troubled fortunes since 2008 — the very time its dealings with Mr. Vadra acquired significant scale. According to a March 1, 2012 report by the respected Veritas Investment Research Corporation, DLF Ltd is an organisation under duress, with its management scrambling to consummate assets sales, rationalize its land bank and divest non-core operations.

Since a May, 2007 Initial Public Offering, which sold at Rs. 525 per share, the stock price declined by 46 per cent in March 2012 compared to a roughly 30 per cent gain in the Sensex over the same period with the stock presently trading at Rs. 241.80, a steep 54.13 per cent dip.

Veritas points to questionable related-party transactions, aggressive and conflicting accounting policies, self-enrichment and inability to deliver on promises, and a balance sheet stretched to the limit, with no free cash flow and no credible plan to de-lever its balance sheet. “If your investment decision incorporates management integrity, then bypassing DLF will be an easy choice,” the Veritas report states.

In addition, Veritas does “not believe the disclosed book equity and asset base of the company,” stating that via its dealings (merger) with DLF Assets Ltd (DAL), from FY 2007 to FY 2011, the company inflated sales by at least Rs. 11,236 crore and its profit before tax by Rs. 7,233 crore.

A slowing real estate market in a high inflation environment and over-exposure to Gurgaon — among India’s most speculative real estate markets — is further expected to create tremendous pressure on the company’s balance sheet. “In the end, we believe DLF will seek assistance from financial institutions to restructure its loans,” the report affirms, urging investors not to buy DLF stock. DLF dismissed the report as “mischievous and presumptive.”

Mr. Vadra himself has attributed his brass-to-gold success story to hard work—and a little help from “family” friends like K.P. Singh, the chairman of the DLF Group. However, Mr. Vadra has strongly denied taking any favours from DLF in the past. “I have a good understanding with DLF. Our children are friends, we are friends. They are seasoned businessmen. They are not daft… They don’t need me to enhance them. They’ve existed for years,” he told The Economic Times in March 2011.

Indeed, in January 2002, he made his distaste for favour-seeking capitalism public, dissociating himself from his brother and father, alleging that they were promising jobs and favours using his name and association with the Gandhi family. His father responded by suing him for defamation.

Hard work Mr. Vadra may well have put into building his property empire. But the help he received from friends like DLF suggests at least a part of his success flowed from the willingness of others to bet on the outcome of his enterprise.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/behind-robert-vadras-fortune-a-maze-of-questions/article3975214.ece?homepage=true

THE TRUTH OF 1962:The war we lost -BG Verghese

Posted by admin On October - 6 - 2012 Comments Off

The 1962 Sino-India conflict shocked India and showed China for what it would eventually become —a military superpower. Fifty years later, BG Verghese recounts the war that gave two neighbours a reason to mistrust each other forever

 
Last post A convoy of the Indian Army on the Northeast border

Photo: Getty Images
 
 

THE 1962 Sino-Indian conflict is half a century old, but to understand what happened, one needs to go further back to Indian independence, the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its eventual occupation of Tibet. Perhaps one should go back even earlier to the tripartite Simla Convention of 1914 to which the Government of India, Tibet and China were party and drew the McMahon Line. The Chinese representative initialled the agreement but did not sign it on account of differences over the definitions of Inner and Outer Tibet.
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Fast forward to March 1947 when Jawaharlal Nehru’s Interim Government hosted an Asian Relations Conference in Delhi to which Tibet and China (then represented by the KMT—Kuomintang Party) were invited. India recognised the PRC as soon as it was established in 1949 and adopted a One-China policy thereafter.

In 1951, China moved into Tibet. A 17-Point Agreement granted it autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. This converted what until then was a quiet Indo-Tibet boundary into a problematic Sino-Indian frontier, with China adopting all prior Tibetan claims.

The historic Sino-Indian Treaty on Relations between India and the Tibet Region of China was signed in 1954. India gave up its rights in Tibet without seeking a quid pro quo. The Panch Shila was enunciated, which Nehru presumed presupposed inviolate boundaries in an era of Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai.

The young Dalai Lama came to India in 1956 to participate in the 2,500th anniversary celebrations commemorating the Enlightenment of the Buddha but was reluctant to return home as he felt China had reneged from its promise of Tibetan autonomy. Chou En-lai visited India later that year and sought Nehru’s good offices to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa on the assurance of implementation of the 17-Point Agreement by China in good faith.

Visiting China in 1954, Nehru drew Chou En-lai’s attention to the new political map of India, which defined the McMahon Line and the J&K Johnson Line as firm borders (and not in dotted lines or vague colourwash as previously depicted) and expressed concern over corresponding Chinese maps that he found erroneous. Chou En-lai replied that the Chinese had not yet found time to correct their old maps but that this would be done “when the time is ripe”. Nehru assumed this implied tacit Chinese acceptance of India’s map alignments but referred to the same matter once again during Chou’s 1956 visit to India.

The matter was, however, not pressed. Nehru had in a statement about that time referred to the words of a wise Swedish diplomat to the effect that though a revolutionary power, China would take 20-30 years to fight poverty and acquire the muscle to assert its hegemony. Therefore, it should meanwhile be cultivated and not be isolated and made to feel under siege as the Bolsheviks were in 1917. This postulate was, however, reversed in 1960-62 when Nehru interpreted the same wise Swedish diplomat to mean it was the first 20-30 years after its revolution that were China’s dangerous decades; thereafter the PRC would mature and mellow. This suggests a somewhat fickle understanding of China on Nehru’s part.

The Aksai Chin road had been constructed by China by 1956-57 but only came to notice in 1958 when somebody saw it depicted on a small map in a Chinese magazine. India protested. The very first note in the Sino-Indian White Papers, published later, declared Aksai Chin to be “indisputably” Indian territory ” and, thereafter, incredibly lamented the fact that Chinese personnel had wilfully trespassed into that area “without proper visas”. The best construction that can put on this language is that Nehru was even at that time prepared to be flexible and negotiate a peaceful settlement or an appropriate adjustment. Parliament and the public were, however, kept in the dark.

Though outwardly nothing had changed, Nehru had begun to reassess his position. According to Ashok Parthasarathi, his father, the late G Parthasarathi, met Nehru on the evening of 18 March 1958, after all concerned had briefed him prior to his departure for Peking as the new Indian Ambassador to China. GP recorded what Nehru said in these terms: “So GP, what has the Foreign Office told you? Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai? Don’t you believe it! I don’t trust the Chinese one bit. They are a deceitful, opinionated, arrogant and hegemonistic lot. Eternal vigilance should be your watchword. You should send all your telegrams only to me — not to the Foreign Office. Also, do not mention a word of this instruction of mine to Krishna (then Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon). He, you and I all share a common worldview and ideological approach. However, Krishna believes — erroneously — that no Communist country can have bad relations with any Non-Aligned country like ours.”

Kaul’s promotion to the rank of Lt Gen and then to CGS was controversial. He was politically well-connected but lacked command experience
 
 
This is an extraordinary account and is difficult to interpret other than, once again, as symbolising Nehru’s fickle views on China, which GP had no reason to misquote.

Chinese incursions at Longju and Khizemane in Arunachal Pradesh and the Kongka Pass, Galwan and Chip Chap Valleys in Ladakh followed through 1959. The Times of India broke many of these early stories. There was a national uproar. It was while on a conducted tour of border road construction in Ladakh in 1958 with the Army PRO, Ram Mohan Rao, that I first heard vague whispers of “some trouble” further east. We however went to Chushul — where the airstrip was still open — and the Pangong Lake unimpeded.

The Khampa rebellion in Tibet had erupted and the Dalai Lama had fled to India in 1959 via Tawang where he received an emotional welcome. The Government of India granted him asylum, along with his entourage and over 100,000 refugees that followed, and he took up residence with his government-in-exile in Dharamshala. These events greatly disturbed the Chinese and marked a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. Their suspicions about India’s intentions were not quelled by Delhi’s connivance in facilitating American-trained Tibetan refugee guerrillas to operate in Tibet and further permitting an American listening facility to be planted on the heights of Nanda Devi to monitor Chinese signals in Tibet.

China had by now commenced its westward cartographic-cum-military creep in Ladakh and southward creep in Arunachal Pradesh.

The highly regarded Chief of Army Staff, Gen KS Thimayya, began to envisage a new defence posture vis-à-vis China in terms of plans, training, logistics and equipment. However, Krishna Menon, aided by BN Mullick, the IB chief and intelligence czar, who also was close to Nehru, disagreed with this threat perception and insisted that attention should remain focussed on Pakistan and the “anti-imperialist forces”. Growing interference by Krishna Menon in army postings, promotions and strategic perspectives frustrated Thimayya so much that he tendered his resignation to Nehru in 1959. Fearing a major crisis, the PM persuaded Thimayya to withdraw his resignation, which he unfortunately did at the cost of his authority. Nothing changed. Mullick and Menon sowed in Nehru’s mind the notion that a powerful chief might stage a coup (as Ayub Khan had done in Pakistan). For long, this myth was a factor in the government’s aversion to the idea of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff.

In 1959, en route to Dhaka, President Ayub of Pakistan, in a brief stopover meeting with Nehru in Delhi, had proposed “joint defence”. Joint defence against whom, was Nehru’s scornful and unthinking retort? Yet Nehru was not oblivious of a potential threat from the north, as he had repeatedly told Parliament from the early 1950s that the Himalayan rampart was India’s defence and defence line. He had somewhat grandiloquently and tactlessly proclaimed that though Nepal was indeed a sovereign nation, when it came to India’s security, India’s defence lay along the kingdom’s northern border, Nepal’s independence notwithstanding! Yet he had been remarkably lax in preparing to defend that not-quite-so-impenetrable a rampart or even countenance his own military from doing so.

However, almost a decade later, Himalayan border road construction commenced under the Border Roads Organisation and forward positions were established. This Forward Policy, though opposed by Lt Gen Daulat Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, was pushed by Krishna Menon, de facto Foreign Minister, and equally by BN Mullick, who played a determining role in these events, being present in all inner councils. Many of the 43 new posts established in Ladakh were penny packets with little capability and support or military significance. The objective appeared more political, in fulfilment of an utterly fatuous slogan Nehru kept uttering in Parliament and elsewhere, that “not an inch of territory” would be left undefended; though he had earlier played down the Aksai Chin incursion as located in a cold, unpopulated, elevated desert “where not a blade of grass grows”. In August, Nehru announced that Indian forces had regained 2,500 square miles of the 12,000 square miles occupied by the Chinese in Ladakh.

A series of Sino-Indian white papers continued to roll out. The Times of India commented on 15 August 1962: “Anyone reading the latest White Paper on Sino-Indian relations together with some of the speeches by the prime minister and defence minister on the subject may be forgiven for feeling that the government’s China policy, like chopsuey, contains a bit of everything — firmness and conciliation, bravado and caution, sweet reasonableness and defiance… We have been variously informed… that the situation on the border is both serious and not-so-serious; that we have got the better of the Chinese and they have got the better of us; that the Chinese are retreating and that they are advancing…”

Backseat driving of defence policy continued to the end of Thimayya’s tenure when General PN Thapar was appointed COAS over Thimayya’s choice of Lt Gen SPP Thorat, Eastern Army Commander. In the circumstances, Thorat had produced a paper advocating that while the Himalayan heights might be prepared as a trip-wire defence, the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) should essentially be defended lower down at its waist which, among other things, would ease the Indian Army’s logistical and acclimatisation problems and correspondingly aggravate those of the Chinese. The Thorat plan, “The China Threat and How to Meet It”, got short shrift.

The Goa operation at the end of 1960 witnessed two strange events. The new Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen BM Kaul, marched alongside one of the columns of the 17th Division under Gen KP Candeth that was tasked to enter Goa. Thereafter he and, separately, the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, declared “war” or the commencement of operations at two different times — one at midnight and the other at first light the next morning. In any other situation such flamboyant showmanship could have been disastrous. However, Goa was a cakewalk and evoked the mistaken impression, among gifted amateurs in high places, that an unprepared Indian Army could take on China.

Kaul’s promotion to the rank of lieutenant general and then to the key post of the Chief of General Staff (CGS) had stirred controversy. He was politically well connected and had held PR appointments but lacked command experience. The top brass was divided and the air was thick with intrigue and suspicion. Kaul had inquiries made into the conduct of senior colleagues like Thorat, SD Verma and then Maj Gen Sam Manekshaw, Commandant of the Staff College in Wellington.

Even as the exchange of Sino-Indian notes continued, Nehru on 12 October 1962 said he had ordered the Indian Army “to throw the Chinese out”, casually revealed to the media at Palam Airport before departing on a visit to Colombo!

A new 4th Corps was created on 8 October 1962 with head-quarters at Tezpur in western Assam to reinforce the defence of the Northeast. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh was named GOC but was soon moved to take over 33 Corps at Siliguri and then moved again to the Western Command. Kaul took charge of 4th Corps but appeared to have assumed a superior jurisdiction because of his direct political line to Delhi. Command controversies were further compounded as at times it seemed that both everybody and nobody was in charge. Thapar and Gen LP Sen, now at Eastern Command, also went to recce and reorder defence plans along the Bomdila-Se La sector. At the political level and at the External Affairs Ministry, the adage was “Panditji knows best”.

KAUL WAS here, there and everywhere, exposing himself in high altitudes without acclimatisation. No surprise that he fell ill and was evacuated to Delhi on 18 October, only to return five days later.

Following Nehru’s “throw them out” order, and against saner military advice and an assessment of ground realities, a brigade under John Dalvi was positioned on the Namka Chu River below the Thagla Ridge that the Chinese claimed lay even beyond the McMohan Line. It was a self-made trap: “It was but to do or die”. The brigade retreated in disorder after a gallant action, while the Chinese rolled down to Tawang where they reached on 25 October.

The London Economist parodied Rudyard Kipling. In a pithy editorial titled “Plain Tales From the Hills”, the text read, “When the fog cleared, the Chinese were there”!

A new defence line was hurriedly established at Se La.

I was not in the country during the Namka Chu battle but returned soon thereafter and was asked to go to Tezpur from Bombay to cover the war.

 
Myopic vision Nehru and Krishna Menon underestimated China before 1962
 
 
Nehru was by now convinced that the Chinese were determined to sweep down to the plains. The national mood was one of despondency, anger and foreboding. Only one commentator, the late NJ Nanporia, editor of The Times of India, got it right. In a closely reasoned edit page article, he argued that the Chinese favoured negotiation and a peaceful settlement, not invasion, and that India must talk. At worst, the Chinese would teach India a lesson and go back. Critics scoffed at Nanporia. I too thought he was being simplistic. A week or 10 days later, in response to his critics, he reprinted the very same article down to the last comma and full-stop. Events proved him absolutely right.

On 24 October, Chou En-lai proposed a 20 km withdrawal by either side. Three days later, Nehru sought the enlargement of this buffer to 40-60 km. On 4 November, Chou offered to accept the McMahon Line provided India accepted the Macdonald Line in Ladakh approximating the Chinese claim line (giving up the more northerly Johnson Line favoured by Delhi).

By now I was in Tezpur, lodged at the Planter’s Club, which was now a media dormitory. The Army arranged for the press to visit the front in NEFA. Scores of Indian and foreign correspondents and cameramen volunteered. Col Pyara Lal, the chief Army PRO, took charge. On 15-17 November, we drove up to Se La (15,000 feet) and Dirang Dzong in the valley beyond before the climb to Bomdila. Jawans in cottons and perhaps a light sweater and canvas shoes were manhandling ancient 25-pounders into position at various vantage points. A day earlier, we had seen and heard Bijji Kaul’s theatrics and bravado at 4th Corps Headquarters and were shocked to see the reality: ill-equipped, unprepared but cheerful officers and men digging trenches to hold back the enemy under the command of a very gallant officer, Brig Hoshiar Singh.

We had barely returned to Tezpur on 17 November when we learnt that the Chinese had mounted an attack on Se La, outflanking it as well. Many correspondents rushed back to Delhi and Calcutta more easily to file their copy and despatch their pictures and footage. Military censorship delayed transmission. I discovered later that between the Tezpur Press Officer’s inability to handle much copy and censorship, few if any of my despatches reached The Times of India and those that did, had been severely truncated.

Even as battle was joined, Kaul disappeared from Tezpur to be with his men, throwing the chain of command into disarray. The saving grace was the valiant action fought by Brigadier Navin Rawley at Walong in the Luhit Valley before making an orderly retreat, holding back the enemy wherever possible. Much gallantry was also displayed in Ladakh against heavy odds.

 
Bombastic leadership BM Kaul enjoyed the confidence of his political masters
 
 
The use of the Air Force had been considered. Some thought that the IAF had the edge as its aircraft would be operating with full loads from low altitude air strips in Assam unlike the Chinese operating from the Tibetan plateau at base altitudes of 11,000-12,000 feet. However, the decision was to prevent escalation.

On 18 November, word came that the Chinese had enveloped Se La, which finally fell without much of a fight in view of conflicting orders. A day later, the enemy had broken through to Foothills (both a place name and a description) along the Kameng axis. Confusion reigned supreme.

Kaul or somebody ordered the 4th Corps to pull back to Gauhati on 19 November and, as military convoys streamed west, somebody else ordered that Tezpur and the North Bank be evacuated. A “scorched earth” policy was ordered by somebody else again and the Nunmati Refinery was all but blown up. The district magistrate deserted his post. A former school and collegemate of mine, Rana KDN Singh, was directed to take charge of a tottering administration. He supervised the Joint Steamer Companies, mostly manned by East Pakistan Lascars, to ferry a frightened and abandoned civil population to the South Bank. The other modes of exodus were by bus and truck, car, cart, cycle and on foot. The last ferry crossing was at 6 pm. Those who remained or reached the jetty late, melted into the tea gardens and forest.

The Indian press had ingloriously departed the previous day, preferring safety to news coverage, as it happened again in Kashmir in 1990, when at least women journalists subsequently redeemed the profession. Only two Indians remained in Tezpur, Prem Prakash of Visnews and Reuters, and I, together with nine American and British correspondents. Along with us, wandering around like lost souls, were some 10-15 patients who had been released from the local mental hospital.

THAT WAS the most eerie night I have ever spent. Tezpur was a ghost town. We patrolled it by pale moonlight on the alert for any tell-tale signs or sounds. The State Bank of India had burned its currency chest and a few charred notes kept blowing in the wind as curious mental patients kept prodding the dying embers. Some stray dogs and alley cats were our only other companions.

Nehru’s broadcast to the nation, particularly to “the people of Assam” to whom his “heart went out” did not sound like Churchillian defiance
 
 
Around midnight, a transistor with one of our colleagues crackled to life as Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull back to the pre-October “line of actual control”, provided the Indian Army did not move forward. Relieved and weary, we retired to our billet at the abandoned Planter’s Club whose canned provisions of baked beans, tuna fish and beer (all on the house) had sustained us.

Next morning, all the world carried the news, but AIR still had brave jawans gamely fighting the enemy as none had had the gumption to awaken Nehru and take his orders as the news was too big to handle otherwise! Indeed, during the preceding days, everyone from general to jawan to officials and the media was tuned into Radio Peking to find out what was going on in our own country.

1962 was a politically-determined military disaster. President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan said it all when he indicted the government for its “credulity and negligence”. Nehru himself confessed, artfully using the plural, “We were getting out of touch with reality… and living in an artificial world of our own creation”. Yet he was reluctant to get rid of Krishna Menon, (making him first Minister for Defence Production and then Minister without Portfolio but brazenly carrying on much as before) until public anger compelled the PM to drop him altogether or risk losing his own job.

Nehru was broken and bewildered. His letter to John F Kennedy seeking US military assistance after the fall of Bomdila was abject and pathetic. He feared that unless the tide was stemmed the Chinese would overrun the entire Northeast. The Chinese, he said, were massing troops in the Chumbi Valley and he apprehended another “invasion” from there. If Chushul was overrun, there was nothing to stop the Chinese before Leh. The IAF had not been used as India lacked air defence for its population centres. He therefore requested immediate air support by 12 squadrons of all-weather supersonic fighters with radar cover, all operated by US personnel. But US aircraft were not to intrude into Chinese air space. One does not know what inputs went into drafting Nehru’s letter to Kennedy. Non-alignment was certainly in tatters.

Tezpur limped back to life. On 21 November, Lal Bahadur Shastri, then Home Minister, paid a flying visit on a mission of inquiry and reassurance. He was followed the next day by Indira Gandhi. Nehru had meanwhile broadcast to the nation, and more particularly to “the people of Assam” to whom his “heart went out” at this terrible hour of trial. He promised the struggle would continue and none should doubt its outcome. Hearing the broadcast in Tezpur, however, it did not sound like a Churchillian trumpet of defiance. Rather, it provided cold comfort to the Assamese, many of whom hold it against the Indian state to this day that Nehru had bidden them “farewell”.

 
Away from home People fleeing their homes after the Chinese invaded Arunachal Pradesh
 
 

I remained in Tezpur for a month waiting day after day for the administration to return to Bomdila. This it did under the Political Officer (DM), Major KC Johorey just before Christmas. I accompanied him. The people of NEFA had stood solidly with India and Johorey received a warm welcome.

THAPAR HAD been removed and Gen JN Chaudhuri appointed COAS. Kaul went into limbo. The Naga underground took no advantage of India’s plight. Pakistan had been urged by Iran and the US not to use India’s predicament to further its own cause and kept its word. But it developed a new relationship with China thereafter.

The West and the US had been sympathetic to India and its Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith, had a direct line to Kennedy. However, the US was also preoccupied with growing Sino-Soviet divide and the major Cuban missile crisis that boiled over in October 1962.

The COAS, Gen Chaudhuri ordered an internal inquiry into the debacle by Maj Gen Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat. The Henderson-Brooks Report remains a top-secret classified document though its substance was leaked and published by Neville Maxwell who served as The Times’ London correspondent in India in the 1960s, became a Sinophile and wrote a critical book titled India’s China War. The report brings out the political and military naiveté, muddle, contradictions and in-fighting that prevailed and failures of planning and command. There is no military secret to protect in the Henderson-Brooks Report; only political and military ego and folly to hide. But unless the country knows, the appropriate lessons will not be learnt.

India did not learn the lesson that borders are more important than boundaries and continued to neglect the development of Arunachal and north Assam lest China roll down the hill again. However, given the prevailing global and regional strategic environment and India’s current military preparedness, the debacle of 1962 will not be repeated.

Many have since recorded their versions of what happened in 1962: Kaul, Dalvi, DK (Monty) Palit (who served under Kaul as Director of Military Operations), Neville Maxwell, S Gopal in Volume III of his Nehru biography, SS Khera, Principal Defence Secretary and Cabinet Secretary (in his India’s Defence Problem), YB Chavan (as retold in his biography by TV Kunhi Krishnan), and others. Each has a tale to tell. But the truth, differently interpreted, though widely suspected, remains the greatest casualty of 1962.

BG Verghese was Assistant Editor and War Correspondent, The Times of India

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