20
May , 2013
Monday

JK Alternative Viewpoint

Challenges & Responses to Conflictual Politics

On April 2nd 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. The war Britain fought to recover ...
  U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division depart a mission brief on their ...
The United States has taken steps to pressure its allies outside Europe to move away ...
Muslim Brotherhood supporters at a sit-in protest against the military in Tahrir Square on June ...
  German chancellor Angela Merkel and Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai, centre, together with with foreign ministers ...
    Faces of the revolution: Men of 4th U.S. Colored Infantry, circa 1864   When the guns opened ...
The challenges of diplomacy with Tehran are undeniable. But the potential ramifications of a military ...
THE murder of Christopher Stevens, the American ambassador to Libya, along with three of his ...
Winning elections does not give Islamist forces the right to undermine or bend to their ...

Archive for November, 2011

US may abandon Pakistan supply routes-Amir Mir

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

ISLAMABAD – The United States may abandon Pakistan as a major supply route to Afghanistan unless the blockade on provisions to coalition forces is ended, after Islamabad turned down a request to allow crucial food and military hardware to transit to neighboring Afghanistan unless it receives a formal apology and sees stern action taken against those responsible for the November 26 cross-border air strike that killed at least two dozen Pakistani soldiers.

Shortly after midnight on November 26, American military helicopters rocketed and strafed two lightly manned observation points, known as the Salala security posts, on the Anargai Ghakhi mountain peak in Mohmand tribal agency, about 2.5 kilometers inside Pakistani territory on the Afghan border.

The check posts had been recently set up to stop Taliban militants

 
holed up in Afghanistan from crossing the border and staging attacks in Pakistan. The Salala security posts are located in the Taliban-controlled Baizai area of Mohmand tribal agency, a well-known hotbed of militant activity that has significantly impacted security on both sides of the border. Baizai is a known transit point and safe haven for two key commanders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) – Faqir Mohammad and Mullah Fazlullah.

The air strike, in which at least 24 soldiers were killed has plunged the frosty Pakistan-US ties into deeper crisis because it took place a day after US General John Allen met the Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani to discuss border control and enhanced cooperation. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is often poorly marked and differs on various maps by up to five miles in some places. A similar incident on September 30, 2009, which killed two Pakistani troops, led to the closure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply routes through Pakistan for 10 days. NATO apologized for that incident, which it said happened when gunships mistook warning shots by the Pakistani forces for a militant attack. But retaliating angrily, Pakistan immediately suspended supply routes.

According to highly informed diplomatic sources in Islamabad, the US has already explored several alternative supply routes for the international forces stationed in Afghanistan in the wake of an increasing number of attacks on NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) convoys travelling through Pakistan, coupled with a frequent suspension of the supply routes by the Pakistani authorities. Pakistan currently receives a huge reimbursement of economic and military assistance from the United States for providing these logistical facilities to the war-torn country. The NATO/ISAF convoys travelling through Pakistan are the principal source of logistical support for coalition forces. Pakistan, being the shortest and most economical route, has been used for nearly a decade to transit almost 75% of ammunition, vehicles, foodstuff and around 50% of fuel for coalition forces fighting the Taliban militia in Afghanistan.

The November 26 attack has caused an intense diplomatic tussle between Islamabad and Washington. Besides suspending NATO supplies to Afghanistan, Pakistan has ordered the Americans to vacate Shamsi airbase in Balochistan within 15 days. Shamsi Airbase – leased out to the United Arab Emirates, which sublet it to American forces – was the major operational center for US drones. Pakistani President Asif Zardari has already turned down a request by the UAE government to extend the deadline for withdrawal of the US troops from the base. Official military delegations between the two countries have also been cancelled.

No direct apology has come either from the US or from NATO, though both have expressed regret over the ”tragic, unintended” deaths of the Pakistani soldiers. A White House spokesman has issued a statement saying President Barack Obama sees the deaths of Pakistani soldiers in a NATO raid as a tragedy. A joint statement by US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who offered their condolences for the loss of life, backed an investigation into the incident and stressed the importance of the Pakistan-US partnership. On the other hand, the western media quoted senior Western and Afghan officials as saying that a small group of US and Afghan forces on patrol in Kunar province were fired on first from positions inside Pakistani territory, prompting calls for close air support which wiped out the two Pakistani mountain posts.

The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed Afghan officials and one Western official, has caused fury in Islamabad with a report that the attack was called to shield NATO and Afghan forces targeting Taliban fighters. The fire came from remote outposts in the Mohmand region.

A spokesman for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General Carsten Jacobson, told CNN that ”a technical situation on the ground … caused the force to call for close air support and it is this close air support that highly likely caused the soldiers that perished on the Pakistani side.” In another interview to CBS News, General Jacobson elaborated that Afghan and NATO forces were holding a joint exercise in Kunar, close to the border with Pakistan. ”Air support was called in, and it is highly likely that this close air support killed Pakistani soldiers,” he said. General Jacobson assured Pakistan that an investigation was under way into why close support had been called in: ”We need to have the technical proof of what was said at what time by whom to whom. Speed is not important, but we need to get the Pakistani side involved to find out what their involvement was,” he said.

But the Pakistani military has maintained that the attack was intentional and unwarranted. Major General Athar Abbas, chief spokesman for the Pakistan military, said he did not believe that ISAF or Afghan forces had received fire from the Pakistani side. ”I cannot rule out the possibility that this was a deliberate attack by ISAF. Let me inform you that a total of 72 Pakistani soldiers have been killed in eight cross border attacks by the Allied Forces during last three years. The latest episode has deeply impacted the progress made by the two countries on improving bilateral relations, forcing Pakistan to revisit its current terms of engagement with the United States”, said the military spokesman.
In an interview with CNN, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani warned that there would be ”no more business as usual” with Washington after what his government has been describing as ”unprovoked NATO attack on Pakistani territory”. He went on to add that for the relations to continue there had to be ”mutual respect and respect for Pakistani sovereignty” which he regretted was no longer the case. Gilani, who added that an apology this time would not be enough to satisfy his nation, has also decided to take parliament into confidence about the review of relations with the United States.

Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar has made it clear that first of all, there must be a formal apology from the US over the killings followed by a thorough investigation into the incident and stern punishment to the people responsible for

it. Only then would Pakistan decide what to do, she added. A statement issued here by the Foreign Office said Khar told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a phone conversation: ”The incident negates the progress made by the two countries on improving relations and forces Pakistan to revisit the terms of engagement with the United States.” Interior Minister Rehman Malik has declared that the NATO supplies have not been suspended, but stopped permanently.

There are two routes into Afghanistan from Pakistan, one across the Khyber Pass in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province to the Afghan border town of Torkham and on to Kabul.

The other goes through the Balochistan Province to the border town of Chaman and on to the southern Afghan city, and former Taliban stronghold, of Kandahar. On an average, around 300 heavy vehicles, 200 container-mounted trailers and 100 tankers set off daily from Pakistan to Afghanistan through these two supply routes to transport food and military supplies meant for coalition forces stationed in Afghanistan.

Available figures show that since January this year a total of 109 NATO convoys have been targeted by the Taliban militants, killing 52 people, most of whom were drivers of the trucks. The convoys that were targeted included fuel tankers, each of which carries about 45,000 litres of oil, as well as containers with unspecified quantities of logistic material for the 120,000-strong NATO/ISAF Forces, besides armored transport for the allied forces, which were either torched or looted by militants. Apart from tonnes of small commodities being transported everyday from Pakistan to Afghanistan, choppers and Humvees were also transshipped via this route in the past few years.

However, diplomats say that having fully realized the Pakistan-Afghan supply route was no longer safe, the high command of the allied forces has accelerate efforts to secure an agreement with some of the former Russian states to allow food and military supplies to pass through the Central Asian republics.

That the Americans have been trying to secure multiple supply routes for transportation of food and military supplies to Afghanistan is already an open secret. Landlocked, mountainous, inundated by war and extreme underdevelopment, Afghanistan is surrounded by a clutch of hostile, apprehensive, barely functioning sovereignties. But the allied forces there require a phenomenal amount of supplies – from ammunition to toothbrushes, fuel, computers, night-vision goggles, concertina wire etc – at the rate of thousands of tons per day.

The main problem is that these supply trucks are civilian-operated, with no military escorts, primarily because of the Pakistani sensitivities about its sovereignty. Therefore, many of the trucks become an easy target of the militants, prompting the Americans to seek alternative supply routes from countries which can also allow security men to guard them.

According diplomats, the Americans are now trying to secure three different alternative supply routes for Afghanistan. The first one is the northern route which starts in the Latvian port of Riga, the largest all-weather harbor on the Baltic Sea, where container ships offload their cargo onto Russian trains. The shipments roll south through Russia, then southeast around the Caspian Sea through Kazakhstan and finally south through Uzbekistan until they cross the frontier into north Afghanistan. The Russian train-lines were built to supply Russia’s own war in Afghanistan in the 1980′s, and these can be used by the US-led forces in their own Afghan campaign.

The second one is the southern route which transits the Caucuses, completely bypassing Russia, from Georgia. Starting from the Black Sea port, Ponti, it travels north to Azerbaijan and its port, Baku, where goods are loaded onto ferries to cross the Caspian Sea. Landfall is Kazakhstan, where the goods are carried by truck to Uzbekistan and finally Afghanistan. While shorter than the northern route, it is more expensive because of the on-and-off loading from trucks to ferries and back onto trucks. A third supply route, which is actually a spur of the northern route, bypasses Uzbekistan and proceeds from Kazakhstan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which has a north east border with Afghanistan. However, this route is hampered by bad road conditions in Tajikistan.

Yet there are those in the Pakistani security establishment who think that it would be hard for the Americans to induce any of the former Russian states for the NATO supplies because many of their leaders believe that the American plans to get military supplies via their countries could draw the former Soviet colony into the battle as Cambodia was dragged into the Vietnam war. But diplomats say NATO is already using some alternate supply routes after a string of disruptions caused by the Pakistani authorities. As recently as July 2011, these circles say, the balance of supplies transiting through Pakistan and the northern distribution network were weighted in Pakistan’s favor, with more than half of ground-transported supplies arriving through Pakistan. But the situation has changed with the US deciding that only 25% of ground cargo should arrive via Afghanistan’s eastern neighbor.

The decision to suspend transit for convoys through Pakistan was taken at a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the highest strategic decision-making forum where it was also decided that all arrangements with the United States and NATO, including diplomatic, political, and military and intelligence activities, would be reviewed. More importantly, Pakistan is also contemplating to boycott the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan where thorny issues about the withdrawal of occupying forces from the war-torn country and dialogue with the Taliban are to be taken up. Pakistan’s absence from the conference is going to be a major setback to US-led efforts to bring the Taliban to the dialogue table.

Pakistani analysts say Islamabad’s cooperation is crucial to ongoing American successes in the region but that the fragility of bilateral ties doesn’t leave much room to withstand disruptive developments such as the November 26 NATO attack. Such ugly episodes will only fuel more anti-American sentiments in Pakistan that will ultimately jeopardize longer-term US interests in the region.

Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.

(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MK30Df01.html

Art beyond boundaries: The Novaro touch -Saadia Qamar

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

 

Novaro began learning glass-blowing at age 14. PHOTO: PUBLICITY
KARACHI: 
As you walk into the Unicorn Gallery, remarkable glass sculptures catch your eye. The glass art exhibition, which commenced on November 24, continues till December 2. Founder of Unicorn Gallery Seemah Niaz spoke passionately about Novaro’s work, “The work whether it is an ashtray or a sculpture in the shape of a fish, has been made by a glass blowing technique which Novaro learned 40 years ago.”

“We are very honoured to display Novaro’s work here. Pakistan has a long tradition in art, but the perception of art is often limited to paintings and sculptures. It is a great honour to start a series of international exhibitions in Pakistan,” added Niaz.

Thirty-five pieces of creations have been displayed and the price ranges between Rs40,000 and Rs475,000.

When Niaz was questioned why the pieces were so expensive, she replied, “We tried discussing the prices of the glass objects with Novaro, and he informed us that he has to pay 60 per cent of tax duty on them in France, excluding the cost of upkeep and processing these objects. He earns only a fraction of the amount from these creations.”

Having lived in Cote d’Azur, southern France, for four decades, Novaro moved to the UAE recently.  He was supposed to visit Pakistan but wasn’t allowed to travel because of his bad health.

Talking  to The Express Tribune via email, Jean Claude Novaro said, “I started at the age of 14 in a glass factory and grew step by step to the point that I am. Honestly, I never thought I would go so far, I am just a pure artist. There was no ambition but only pure passion for my art. Now, I am just pushing my limits by introducing new techniques year after year.

I think my success is due to the fact that I am a pioneer in what I do.”

Novaro has made unique glass creations by integrating 24-carat gold and photo-luminescent pigment inside glass. Niaz says that there are some creations which have silver, gold and semi-precious stones embedded in them. Regarding the innovations, Novaro added, “It is all just part of the research work I do. To integrate layers of gold has required five years of research and it took me seven years of research to find a way to include luminescent-pigment.”

The skills he learnt almost 45 years ago have given him international recognition.

His collectors include well known names like Bill Cosby, Jacque Chirac, Mike Tyson, Prince Albert II of Monaco and Robert de Niro. Novaro has also made his way into the Guinness Book of World Records for the largest hand blown coupe (vase) ever made. He adds, “I love new challenges.

It is about pushing the limits in my art from the technique point of view to even the size of the artwork.”

Published in The Express Tribune, November 29th, 2011.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/298942/art-beyond-boundariesthe-novaro-touch/

Egypt’s Vote Puts Tahrir Square in Perspective -Abigail Hauslohner

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

Egyptian voters queue outside a polling station in the working-class Shubra district in Cairo on Nov. 28, 2011

“This is not supposed to happen,” said Mahmoud Salem, the blogger and parliamentary candidate otherwise known as Sandmonkey, as he stood in line outside a packed polling station in the upper-middle-class Cairo district of Heliopolis on Monday morning. The source of Salem’s distress was the man walking along the queue of a couple hundred prospective voters, handing out fliers for a candidate from the Wafd Party. Another man hung campaign posters across the street, while a block away, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) ran an information booth for anyone who was confused. “The last two days, you weren’t supposed to be campaigning at all,” said Salem, 30. “But it was a festival of campaigning.”

Monday’s parliamentary election — the first relatively free, democratic race in Egypt’s history, and perhaps the biggest bellwether of a long and turbulent Arab Spring — rang in harsh truths for some, a tide of satisfaction and new hopes for others.

A little less than one-third of Egypt’s 85 million citizens live in the regions eligible to vote in this first round of polling. In sharp contrast to the violence and ballot stuffing that made so many of the elections staged by ousted President Hosni Mubarak a sham that few bothered to participate, many thousands of Egyptians stepped up to vote for the first time in their lives on Monday. In many districts, lines stretched around the block, inching slowly forward, the men and women ever determined to reach their goal. “This is the first time for us to elect,” said Mohamed Ismail, an FJP supporter who was voting in a middle-class neighborhood of downtown Cairo. Ismail works in Kuwait but had returned home to engage in this act of democratic citizenship. (See photos of protesters in Cairo.)

Still, to observers — and, indeed, many voters — it was a messy success. To accommodate a population still reeling from more than a week of heavy protests and clashes, Egypt’s military rulers extended the voting period in an already drawn-out process to two days per phase — turning the election for just one house of Parliament into a convoluted nine-day process that will drag on until January. Many voters, confused about polling stations or even the basic rules of voting, complained of government hotlines that didn’t work, and some scrambled for advice from parties. Ballot boxes remain in the polling stations overnight — a ready-made opportunity for ballot stuffing, some fear.

And for many of the liberal youth activists who at one point claimed leadership of the revolution, the election felt like an all-important hurdle that had come a moment too soon. “I still believe we should have postponed it for one week until things calm down,” said Salem. “It feels wrong to vote when the people who fought to get us this right to vote are getting killed and injured, and no one is held accountable for it.”

Only a few thousand demonstrators continued to occupy Tahrir Square on Monday, where hundreds of thousands had massed since Nov. 19, calling for an immediate end to the military rule that replaced Mubarak and the appointment of a civilian government with the power to oversee a transition to democracy. Some demonstrators boycotted Monday’s polls, others stood in line only to write rebellious commentary in the margins of their ballots. And even for those, like Salem, who willingly made the jump from anti-Mubarak youth activist to active participant in the democratic experiment, the latter carried plenty of disappointment. “I think everyone pretty much has a name, but they’re not sure what the name stands for,” he said of voter selection inside the polls. “We don’t have enough time to talk to the people, and they don’t have enough time to know who we are.” (See what’s at stake in Egypt’s elections.)

Indeed, many voters expressed only a vague resolve to select one party or candidate over another; some citing only name recognition as their reason. To accommodate a high rate of illiteracy and similar names, each candidate is matched with a symbol. But in Salem’s district alone, there are 94 candidates — so many that one candidate is represented by a desktop computer while another, Salem, by a laptop. “Vote for the scissors!” one man yelled to a queue of voters outside one Cairo polling station.

Standing in line in the relatively wealthy district of Heliopolis, Salem turned to the voters behind him. “If anyone knows anything about the other 95 candidates, say something,” he said to the group of strangers. “God knows,” somebody else replied.

For those who weren’t sure, the Muslim Brotherhood was ready. At most polling stations on Monday, the Islamist group’s FJP had set up a help desk, reprising the role that is the source of its grassroots popularity — providing the social services that the government had failed to provide. “The government made a site on the Internet, where you can enter your national ID to find your polling station. But many people in Egypt don’t know how to use the Internet, so we made this for them,” explained Mustafa Qabil, a volunteer at a FJP station in south Cairo that included seven laptop-computer help stations set up inside a tent. In some districts, the party even provided volunteers to maintain order in the queues. (See why it will take more than elections to break the military’s hold on Egypt.)

Amr Hamzawy, a prominent liberal intellectual and one of Salem’s rival candidates in Heliopolis, made a point of stopping to yell at every FJP booth he came upon as

he circulated in the district. At one polling station, he pleaded with an electoral-committee official to refer the Brotherhood’s election-day campaigning to the electoral commission.

“To be honest with you,” the official replied, “They can’t do anything either. You can’t control the street.”

Indeed, Monday’s vote may prove to be a vindication of the Egyptian street — but not, perhaps, the street that Tahrir activists such as Salem or Hamzawy had imagined. Spurred by months of organized campaigning and years of grassroots outreach, supporters of the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties turned out in force.

“Elections are going great. There are no thugs, no violence,” said a woman wearing a full-face veil, who gave her name as Um Abdallah. Like most Egyptians voting on Monday, she said she never voted in prior elections, held under Mubarak.

“Our voices wouldn’t have gone to those who deserve it,” she said. But the revolution, she said, had ushered in new freedoms and new opportunities, a chance for Egypt to finally choose leaders who express its character and ambition.

“What I’m looking for is someone honest — not someone who’s going to take money from the people, and not someone who’s just going to sit in the chair and forget about the people,” added Abdallah’s friend, waiting in line behind her in the working-class Cairo district of Shubra. “The people in Tahrir are not all Egyptians, by the way,” she added. “They’re paid to be there.” — With reporting by Robin Al Kayyali / Cairo
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2100432,00.html

Saving the Euro Will Mean Worse Trouble for Europe=Vivien A. Schmidt

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

Charting the Disastrous Choices Ahead
The EU has tried repeatedly, and failed repeatedly, to calm its markets. That is not for a lack of solutions at hand. Consider three: make the European Central Bank (ECB) a lender of last resort, spread exposure by pooling eurozone debt via eurobonds, or massively increase the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and start bailing out weak economies in earnest.

Any of those solutions would reinstate confidence and lead to stability, but each is easier said than done.

The first and arguably best solution — in which the ECB simply buys debt without limits from Italy or any other member state in trouble — is legally questionable under the EU treaty; what’s more, Berlin rejects the idea, citing the bank’s limited mandate, and says it could spark inflation. The creation of eurobonds is a political nonstarter for northern European states distrustful of their profligate, crisis-prone counterparts in the south. And eurozone leaders have already tried — unsuccessfully — to create a bigger EFSF on the cheap by asking the BRIC countries to buy in.

Simply put, markets are reeling because eurozone countries have failed to go beyond half-measures to resolve the crisis. The longer they delay taking any one of the three possible solutions, the closer the markets push them to the brink of disaster. But here’s the rub: if the eurozone survives, the consequences may be just as ruinous. Austerity will be a drag on growth in the center and the north of Europe, and on competitiveness in the south. Add to this increasing unemployment, inequality, and poverty, and the continent has prepared a recipe for rising social unrest and polarization on the political extremes. Not until European leaders realize the fundamental flaw in their current approach — a lack of real political and economic integration — will there be an end to the crisis in sight.

European leaders have cut off the political debates that might provide better policies with greater public legitimacy. As a result, rather than saving the euro and, with it, Europe, they may kill off both. First, consider the euro going bust. Europe would undergo a vast and painful transformation. How exactly it would happen remains uncertain, but there is little doubt that it would be ugly. Just think of spreads on Italian or Spanish debt zooming past ten percent; one would default, then possibly the other. France would surely follow, given the exposure of its banks to Italian debt, then, even, Germany. The EU as such would nonetheless survive, along with the single market. But that is where the certainty ends.

One of two post-euro scenarios could emerge. In the first, a small group of northern European countries rally around Germany to create a new currency outside the eurozone and, arguably, the EU. The problem is that the new currency would skyrocket in value overnight because, without the dilution from the less competitive south, it would become much too strong to sustain powerful export-oriented economies.

In the second, the southern Europeans leave the eurozone in exchange for a modern-day Marshall Plan funded by, say, the richer eurozone members through the EFSF. The upside is that they would regain competitiveness through the depreciation of their currencies, rather than through the reduction of workers’ wages and entitlements. The downside is they would have to go back to national currencies, near-zero liquidity, inflation spurred by

the higher price of imports, and, most likely, a ruined banking system.

Accordingly, no country is seriously contemplating an exit from the EU, however unpopular staying in has become. By the best estimate, at the very last minute and at great cost, the euro will most likely be saved. The ECB will finally decide that because the eurozone’s financial stability and, indeed, the single currency’s very existence is at risk, it can buy member-state debt without limit and still remain under the terms of the treaty.

At the same time, the member-states will greatly increase the financial firepower of the EFSF, with further support from the IMF, reinforced by money from the BRIC countries.

But even if Europe saves its common currency, it will not solve the continent’s biggest problems. Hiding behind Europe’s debt crisis is both a growth crisis and a competitiveness crisis. The former is a result of the austerity policies that EU leaders signed onto last May in exchange for Germany’s agreement to bail out Greece and establish the EFSF. Radical deficit reductions and fiscal consolidation was the answer. Rather than calming markets and restarting growth, however, it has produced an economic slowdown across Europe, which is now likely heading toward a double-dip recession, and less rather than more market confidence.

Austerity has already taken a toll. Across Europe, there has been a rapid increase of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Very little has been done at the EU level to ease the pain. One has to wonder where Social Europe is.  The structural funds designed to promote economic development in regions in need have gone mostly unused by the poorest of the southern European regions, largely because they lack the administrative capacity to jump through the bureaucratic hoops required to access the funds. Likewise, the European globalization adjustment fund (EGF), set up in 2007 with great fanfare to address unemployment problems resulting from globalization, turns out to have disbursed almost no money in 2010, even as unemployment continues to rise.

Then there is the competitiveness crisis. As the across-the-board cuts mandated by EU authorities for southern Europe spare nothing — including investment in areas required for future growth, like training and education, support for job and business creation, and economic modernization — these countries will not be able to get out from under their debts, let alone prosper. Austerity measures designed on the so-called German model may work for Germany’s export-fueled economy. But it spells nothing short of decline for Europeans on the Mediterranean.

The EU’s crises are not just economic and social. They are also political. Politics in Europe are already becoming more national. Euroskepticism is on the rise both in southern Europe, where citizens see the EU as imposing unnecessarily harsh austerity to placate northern Europe, and in the north, where citizens see the EU as imposing unnecessarily high costs in bailing out the south. European leaders have done little to counter these perceptions.

In Germany, for example, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s discourse in the months before agreeing to the first Greek bailout and creation of the EFSF did nothing to prepare the public for it, and instead seemed to agree with the tabloid press bent on castigating the lazy Greeks. As such, “saving” the euro proved a much harder sell. The same problem holds for today. Although she now proclaims the need for deeper political and economic integration, Merkel remains the primary holdout to the ECB’s becoming a lender of last resort.

Accordingly, political extremes are surging in capitals across Europe. Populist parties have become increasingly vocal in opposition to bailouts, from France’s extreme right National Front to Germany’s extreme left Die Linke (the Left Party). In the Netherlands, Gert Wilders has succeeded in making his Freedom Party the second most popular in the Netherlands by shifting his emphasis from anti-Muslim to anti-European politics, while the far-left Socialists, equally opposed to the eurozone rescue packages, have also moved up in the polls. Anti-European sentiment has even increased outside the eurozone, most noticeable recently in Britain, with the backbenchers’ revolt in the Conservative party.

Those really pulling the political levers now are the so-called technocrats. For national democracies, the resignations of elected prime ministers, whether Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or George Papandreou in Greece, and their replacement by presidentially appointed economists, have raised direct questions about the democratic legitimacy of unelected officials taking the place of elected governments.

But whereas Italy’s shift to a technocratic government could very well be a chance to make democracy work anew — with a replay of the country’s mid-1990s success in reforming to join the euro, now to stay in — this is much less clear in the case of Greece, which, under the harsh orders of the troika technocrats (IMF, ECB, and European Commission), imposed increasing pain on a disenfranchised public. In this light, Papandreou’s call for a referendum could be seen as a genuine desire to bring participatory democracy back in, by allowing the electorate to vote on whether to accept the bailout package and, by extension, to stay in or to leave the eurozone.

The catch, however, is that in re-enfranchising the Greek public Papandreou was single-handedly disenfranchising the greater public of eurozone countries, who all knew that the fate of the euro suddenly hinged on the referendum vote.

Given the delays and hesitant solutions that have repeatedly failed to calm the markets, the real European power centers — and Germany in particular — have not, to put it bluntly, led. The European Parliament, the only directly elected body in the EU, has barely been involved, so there has been no political debate to change the conversation over the efficacy of austerity. EU leaders do not seem to see a problem with the rise of technocracy, or the recourse to automatic rules, agreed without parliamentary debate, whether in the EU or national government. But they are likely to be in for a rude awakening, in particular if markets decide that Italian, Spanish, or French debt is too much to handle.

The EU needs more than deeper economic integration. It also needs deeper political integration. Talk has surfaced about a new fiscal pact that would impose restrictions on national budgets. Although this is the right move to convince the ECB that becoming lender of last resort will not open the door to moral hazard, since the pact is to bind all countries to fiscal probity, the austerity policies embedded in it are likely only to reinforce the growth crisis. Moreover, by undermining one of the main tenets of parliamentary democracy — budgetary responsibility — it will only increase the Eurozone’s democratic deficit.

Blinkered by their increasingly euro-critical electorates and, dare it be said, by their neoliberal and ordoliberal (read: German) economic ideas, EU leaders have so far ruled out the appropriate economic initiatives that could solve the debt crisis. Equally problematic, they have cut off the political debates that might provide better policies with greater public legitimacy. As a result, EU leaders, rather than saving the euro and, with it, Europe, may kill off both.

(Photo: Thierry Roge / Courtesy Reuters.)
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136694/vivien-a-schmidt/saving-the-euro-will-mean-worse-trouble-for-europe?page=show

After the Scream: Occupy Wall Street Reforms Itself-Matthew Wolfe

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

The Murry Bergtraum High School For Business Careers, a massive, modernist citadel that stands directly opposite One Police Plaza, the NYPD’s Lower Manhattan headquarters, was, protesters agreed, an odd place for Occupy Wall Street to hold a meeting. But the evening’s work needed privacy, quiet, and a good chunk of unbroken physical space; the school’s second-story cafeteria, cleared of students and lunch tables, offered all three. So, on November 7, hundreds of occupiers—many of whom were only months ago strolling the halls of their own secondary schools—converged on the cafeteria’s scuffed linoleum floor, sat down in a circle, and set about the messy business of reforming a political movement.

Since its first day, the occupation has employed the general assembly, or GA, as its governing body. As it is practiced in Zuccotti Park, the GA is a salmagundi of impassioned dissent. It both a soapbox and a chorus, a leaderless collective that is at once communal and individualistic—the movement in microcosm. Participating in a GA, you feel yourself initiated into something singular and slightly audacious. An observer compared the experience to that ecstasy of unity described by Whitman in “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry,” (“The simple, compact, well-join’d scheme—myself disintegrated, every one disintegrated, yet part of the scheme.”) Protesters revere it as the closest thing the occupation, not yet two months old, has to a civic tradition.

Adhering to a philosophy of direct, not representative democracy, the GA is open to anyone.

Rather than conduct up-and-down votes, the assembly makes decisions through a process of consensus. Under consensus, a group acts unanimously. Anyone can submit a proposal, but it will only pass and be adopted if the entire group endorses it; if anyone blocks the proposal, it’s vetoed or tabled for later consideration. To accommodate its many participants, Occupy Wall Street uses a slightly modified consensus process, in which a block is overridden if nine-tenths of the GA votes against it. Such a system, GA proponents say, provides everyone a voice and prevents the tyranny of a simple majority.

Yet most protesters contend that, as a decision-making body, the GA is a shambolic failure. Meetings drag on for hours, often stalling over niggling disputes or picayune questions of procedure. A few committed obstructionists will often hold up funds necessary for camp operations. Critical concerns—for example, what to do about the looming winter—go unaddressed, as the assembly finds itself overwhelmed by logistical issues. As a result, many of the movement’s most experienced, committed supporters, believing GAs useless, have stopped attending, effectively ceding its control to newcomers.

The GA’s dysfunction is, in a perverse way, testament to Occupy Wall Street’s success. In the months leading up to September 17, a small group of activists met regularly in New York’s Tompkins Square Park, during which time they used a modified GA to discuss ideas and plan the occupation. The group decided that when the protest began, the GA would continue to act as a space to hold political conversation. Marissa Holmes, a graduate student at Hunter College, attended the pre-September 17 GAs. She explained that the GA had never been designed to function as a decision-making body. No one expected the occupation to last very long, so no one thought to create a structure to manage it. “We didn’t think all this was going to happen,” she said. “We were totally unprepared. We thought, ‘Oh, we’ll have this GA and it’ll be great and everyone will be able to speak and then we’ll go home.’ We thought that it would just be an event, a protest. We were creating a space—we weren’t creating an organization.” In the absence of another body, the GA not only guided a political movement but attempted to govern a burgeoning small town.
ON NOVEMBER 6, I, along with about 200 other people, attended an assembly. The wind was up, and we sat huddled in a raggedy sprawl across the steps on the eastern end of Zuccotti Park, everyone packed in coats and scarves, cold but eager. Before the meeting officially began, a man asked to make an announcement about fire safety. Over the last several weeks, the park, doused with rain, sleet, and a salting of snow, has sprouted a motley crop of tents. Most occupiers have moved indoors, and the tents take up more space per capita than al fresco sleeping bags. When the tents press against each other, the danger of a spreading fire, were one to catch, is real. Against this backdrop, the man stepped onto a low stone parapet and asked everyone who occupied the park to raise their hands.

With the exception of maybe a quarter of the audience, everyone kept their hands warming in their pockets. This revealed an ongoing problem with GAs: the people who attend generally don’t live—or even work—in the park. Actual occupiers gripe constantly about the GA’s infiltration by day-trippers. While some of these interlopers stay on and contribute to the movement, the majority hang around just long enough to weigh in a few proposals and maybe ask an uninformed question or two. Most people who do the movement’s heavy lifting never attend GAs, or attend only when they want to make a proposal. As a result, most votes at the GA are now cast by tourists.

The first item of business at that evening’s GA was to be a discussion about a preliminary list of demands, developed by a small group of occupiers, that the assembly might endorse. However, the meeting was quickly interrupted by a tall, skinny man in a white hoodie who said he had an emergency proposal. The man, flanked by members of the People of Color Working Group, said he represented a band of people occupying a building on 142nd Street, in Harlem.

His description of the occupation’s purpose, chopped up by the people’s mic, was difficult to understand. The group was battling predatory lending and mortgage fraud, he said, and the building’s owners had sabotaged the building’s boiler and locked out the tenants. His group, the occupiers, had secured a new boiler and broken the locks, but needed money for food and supplies. He then asked the assembly for $2,000 to continue the occupation—$500 to help reimburse expenses already incurred in the occupation and another $1,500 “for survival.”

After a proposal is introduced at the GA, the assembly is given time to ask questions. A man stood up and asked the speaker how, precisely, the money would be used. His reply came from a member of the working group, who shouted back that the money would be going toward various uses—utilities, bills, food, cleaning supplies, towels, toiletries, and “metro.”

“This battle has been going on for over seven years,” the man continued, cryptically. “The judge locked us out of the courtroom, and the other attorney is in prison because he is not an attorney.”

Next, a women asked why the proposal was an emergency. This question was fielded by another member of the group, also a woman, who wore a pink scarf and spoke in a voice of abject outrage. She explained that if the money was not made available now, the pipes in the building would freeze. She thundered on, emphasizing each of her points by stabbing her fingers in the air, making of the people’s mic a powerful call-and-response.

“This is the reality!”

“This is the reality!”

“Of living in the hood!”

“Of living in the hood!”

“In New York City!”

“In New York City!”

“This is the reality!”

“This is the reality!”

“Of people fighting! ”

“Of people fighting! ”

“For their homes! ”

“For their homes! ”

“And their lives! ”

“And their lives!”

“Because of Wall Street! ”

“Because of Wall Street! ”

“And predatory lending! ”

“And predatory lending!”

She concluding by saying that, were the proposal not passed and the aforementioned boiler not installed, children and old people would freeze.

The assembly had heard enough. A middle-aged man, calling the occupation a matter of life and death, declared that the proposal should be immediately approved.

A woman, introducing herself as an occupier from Chicago, argued that the group should receive either the amount it had requested or half of Occupy Wall Street’s treasury, “whichever is more.” (At the time of the meeting, the movement had about $300,000.) Another suggested the group receive $3,000 instead of $2,000—an amendment that the group, laughing happily, accepted. When a few attendees stood up and raised concerns about whether funding another occupation might be too costly or whether this might lead to Occupy Wall Street being approached by more groups seeking funds, they were met with death glares. After about a half-hour of debate, the amended proposal—the group would now receive $3,000—was finally put to the assembly and was greeted with a sea of wiggling fingers. It passed, and everyone cheered.

Later, asking the members of the working group about the building, I learned that their occupation involved Wall Street and predatory lending only tangentially, if at all. As it was explained to me, a large loan had been extended to the owners of the building several years ago, upon which they’d soon defaulted. The owners were using this default as a legal pretext—precisely what kind of pretext, no one could say—to push the tenants out, with the intention of bringing in new, wealthier, whiter tenants. The sabotage of the boiler, it seemed, was part of this ploy.

However, it’s hard to know for sure, because no documentation was provided to the assembly, nor was any asked for.

I asked Justin Strekel, a long-time occupier, who has raised a question about the proposal during the assembly, what he thought of its passage. “It disturbs me,” he said, “that we just set a precedent that anyone who comes together to occupy a building can get up to $3,000 from the GA. If we fund 100 of these buildings, that’s almost our entire budget.”

He pointed out that many of the supplies that the group was requesting money to purchase were already available, for free, from the storage working group, of which he was a member. The problem was, no one had asked him.

“I was this close to blocking the proposal,” he said.

I pointed out that he would get a lot of flack if he went against the crowd.

“Absolutely.”
TO ADDRESS the GA’s flaws, protesters drew up a plan for a new, complementary body: the spokes council. First contrived centuries ago by the Iroquois Nation, and used by numerous resistance movements since (see “From GA to Spokes Council” on page nine of the new issue of the Occupy! gazette), the spokes council differs from the GA in two important ways. First, while anyone can participate in the GA, the council limits participation to people who live or work in Zuccotti Park. Second, whereas the GA is composed of individuals, the spokes council is composed of groups. Every meeting, each group selects a representative to speak and cast votes on its behalf. These representatives sit in a circle, with their groups clustered behind them, like the spokes on a bicycle wheel—the “spokes” in “spokes council” referring doubly to this layout and to the notion of a spokesperson. By reducing the number of participants in (though not spectators to) meetings and ensuring that all have a strong connection to Occupy Wall Street, the council’s architects expect it to help the movement make better decisions, faster.

On October 29, after days of debate, the GA formally authorized the spokes council’s creation and ceded it responsibility over the occupation’s finances and logistics. In doing so, the movement took a step toward becoming a formal organization rather than a loose coalition of like-minded individuals. Such a transformation may better position Occupy Wall Street to endure and grow.

As protesters gathered at Murry Bergtraum High School for the spokes council’s inaugural meeting, they formed working groups—groups of volunteers that have adopted specific tasks at the park, like cleaning or serving food. Each chose a representative to sit in a circle in the middle of the room holding a sign bearing his or her group’s name. Behind them the rest of their groups sat clustered in loose wedges. All of the most prominent working groups and caucuses, such as Direct Action, Kitchen, and People of Color, were in attendance, as well as some more obscure ones, such as Architecture and Tea & Herbal Medicine.

The first task of the council was to decide which of these groups merited admission. Groups could apply for entry as one of two types of groups: operations groups and caucuses. Operations groups provide logistical and financial support to the occupation, while caucuses represent occupiers “with a shared experienced of marginalization,” such as women and racial minorities. This would be done, as in the GA, through a process of consensus. Behind the working groups, a penumbra of protesters, unaligned with any specific group, hung around and watched.

To speed things along, a half-dozen resolutely upbeat facilitators roved around the center of the circle and held court. Armed with microphones—clearly more efficient than the human mic—the facilitators called out the names of each group seeking admission. The representatives then took a moment to turn around and consult with their own groups. If any group wished to ask questions or raise concerns to another group’s admission, their representative raised their sign. Groups for which no one raised a sign were admitted to the council.

Packed with bodies, the cafeteria quickly grew stifling, but the process clipped along smoothly. At the end of two hours, two caucuses—People of Color Caucus and Queering OWS—and a dozen working groups had been approved for admission. The protesters only had use of the space until 10 p.m., so debate over the other forty groups, which had received raised signs, would have to be postponed for a few days, when the council was scheduled to meet again. The only major interruption came when Georgia Sagri, the representative for the Direct Democracy working group, stood up and spit out a sharp rebuke to the spokes council.

“I think through the spokes group process that working groups become organizations and become parties,” she said, “and I’m totally concerned about that. I think this puts us in a very difficult and vulnerable position.”

Sagri’s statement was met with a mix of the hand signals that occupiers use to signal their feelings: some up, some down, and some in the middle. Indeed, while most protesters supported the creation of the spokes council—when placed to a vote in the GA, it was approved 280 to 17—many dissenters worried that it would make the movement more fragmented and less democratic. For some, the council was dangerously close to a traditional representative democracy, something antithetical to the spirit of Occupy Wall Street.
EVEN AS the spokes council takes shape, the GA will continue to exist, becoming a forum primarily for debate and discussion. While the GA didn’t always function well as a deliberative body, it has remained a place in which people can speak and be heard. In explaining the use of the GA, Marissa Holmes cites the Marxist sociologist John Holloway’s concept of “the scream.” According to Holloway, before true change can occur, there must be an abject refusal—a scream. Holmes says that the GA is a “voice for people who just want to air their grievances.”

Max Hode, a member of the sanitation working group, told me that though he admired the GA, adopting the spokes council was the right move. “It’s actually one of the more beautiful things,” says Hode, “that some guy could come in here and say ‘I propose we spend 300 grand on this thing that I came up with—any objections?’ And then no one blocks and we do it. But I think the spokes council model is the result of us believing that we’re going to be here for a while and wanting something more representative of what we’re trying to be.”
Matthew Wolfe is a writer who lives in Brooklyn.
http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=561

Twenty Letters to a Father-Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

“This book is not the work of a sensationalist or a traitor. It is wrung from an agonized conscience and a sickened heart.”
When Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., visited Moscow last summer, he found the Russians agitated and upset over the impending publication of Svetlana Alliluyeva’s memoirs. They wanted publication postponed until after this month’s observance of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Failing that, they tried to blunt the event by leaking in advance a bowdlerized version of the much-awaited book by Joseph Stalin’s daughter. Mr. Schlesinger, chronicler of the Ages of Jackson and Roosevelt, and of the Kennedy Administration, here illuminates the historical values of Mrs. Alliluyeva’s book written before her flight from the Soviet Union and before she composed the remarkable document to Boris Leonidovich Pasternak, first published in the June Atlantic.

History, in the end, becomes a form of irony; and little could be more ironical on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution than the publication of an indictment of Communism by the daughter of Joseph Stalin. At first, indictment may not seem the right word for this apparently gentle book. Svetlana Alliluyeva’s Twenty Letters to a Friend is on the surface a romantic memoir, saturated with a wistful lyricism and by no means always clear or unambiguous in its testimony. But its nostalgia masks a clarity and even savagery of memory and judgment—a daughter’s wounded judgment of a father, of an epoch, and of great hopes betrayed. “I believe,” she writes in an author’s note, “that I am, in a way, bearing witness.” No one else saw the terrible history of Stalinism through a perspective at once so privileged and so confined; and the witness she bears, in the very narrowness and intensity of its observation, adds vastly to our understanding of the comedy and tragedy of absolute power.

Alliluyeva tells us that she wrote this book between July 16 and August 20, 1963, in the village of Zhukova outside Moscow. The letter form, informal and discursive, evidently provided the ideal means of releasing the flood of unbearable recollection so long dammed up in the depths of her consciousness. Clearly the writing became a therapeutic exercise, a coming to terms at last with experiences whose significance and enormity had been too great for the young Svetlana to grasp “Now that I’ve managed to shed the intolerable burden that was pressing on me,” she writes toward the end, “I feel as though I’d been scaling the cliffs up a mountainside and that at last I reached the top …. The rivers are sparkling in the valleys, and the sun is shining over everything. I thank you, my friend.”

And the friend? It was he who urged her to write the letters and who provided the initial audience; “it did not occur to me at the time that the book I was writing might be published.” Alliluyeva has subsequently described the friend to The New York Times as a “scientist,” belonging “also to the world of literature,” whom she could not name because “he might have troubles.”

But whomever she thought she was writing to, one cannot resist the impression that in some sense these letters are addressed to the father who she regards with so much love and horror.

The text shows signs of emotion and haste in composition. It is, for example, excessively repetitious; nearly every point is made two or three times. There are occasional factual discrepancies. Thus she writes twice that she made her first visit to Leningrad in 1955, but then says elsewhere that her mother took her there in 1926. The point is trivial, since she was six months old at the time of this first visit and obviously remembered nothing of it, but it indicates a certain looseness in brushwork. So again, though most authorities say she was born in 1925, she gives her birth date as February, 1926.

It would be a mistake, though, to suppose that the letters represent only an unorganized and chaotic flow of consciousness. These memories had evidently taken shape within her over the long years and by 1963 had assumed sharp dramatic form. The apparent artlessness of the narrative is accompanied by considerable skill in the ordering and presentation of her materials. Throughout she introduces her characters with a marked sense of literary, almost novelistic, effect. Her mother, for example, receives much tantalizing mention in earlier letters but is not fully portrayed until Letter 8; and her nurse Alexandra Bychkov, perhaps the person closest to her in these years, does not really emerge until the last letter.

s it the nature of Alliluyeva’s literary education or the nature of Russian life itself that makes so much of this book echo with the sounds of classic Russian writers? The first letter, with its superb and appalling account of her father’s death, could almost be a scene from Dostoevsky. The sketches of her mother’s family, especially the story of Aunt Anna (Letter 5), have a distinct Chekhovian ring. The play of coincidence in her recollections equals Russian folklore, or Dr. Zhivago. Thus her father (she has heard) rescued her mother from drowning when she was two years old and then, meeting her again fifteen years later, married her. Things seem generally to happen to Alliluyeva “ten years to the day since my mother’s death,” or “ten years to the day since my father had come into my room in a rage and struck me across the face,” or (her last meeting with her father) on “November 9, 1952, the twentieth anniversary of my mother’s death.”

Above all she evokes nature as a backdrop to emotion with the deplorable facility of a minor Russian romantic novelist: the evening sun lights the grass and the woods with gold, the white birches shimmer, the air is thick with the sweet, heady smell of grass and the fragrance of wild blackberries, “the freshly washed earth was so lovely that I wanted to gasp for joy.” Again how ironic that the survival of the “Russian soul” through the ordeal of Stalinism should be so vividly demonstrated by the daughter of Stalin! Her prose is filled with images of decay and renewal, of death and rebirth.

The ultimate contrast in these letters is between light and shade—on the one hand, “that place of sunshine I call my childhood,” those “cloudless days … sunny and gay”; and on the other, the shadowed years after her mother’s death, the “dark empty house where my father spent the last twenty years of his life,” the season of somberness and destruction. “It was as though,” she concludes, “my father was at the center of a black circle and anyone who ventured inside vanished or perished.”

This is, so to speak, the broad lighting effect. Yet in detail her mother’s era does not seem to have been all that idyllic for Svetlana, nor her father’s all that gloomy. She remembers her mother as aloof, preoccupied, even cold: “I cannot recall her kissing or caressing me ever. She was afraid of spoiling me because my father petted and spoiled me enough as it was …. I saw my mother so rarely.” As for her father, though she loved him less, she remembers him as “always carrying me in his arms, giving me loud, moist kisses and calling me pet names like ‘little sparrow’ and ‘little fly.’” Svetlana had no idea at the time that she owed “our whole happy childhood” to her mother; “we only realized it later, when she was no longer there.”

Why this conflict between the broad effect and the detail, between memory and experience? The clue lies, I think, in her remark to the New York Times that “our family was the battlefield of the struggle”—the struggle in the aftermath of the Revolution between idealism and power, ends and means, good and evil. The light-and-shade imagery evidently results not from her contemporaneous feelings as an oblivious child but from her later attempt to assess the meaning of the mysterious drama which pervaded her childhood.

Her mother’s family, the Alliluyevs, were a Russian family of the sort made familiar to us by Chekhov—”all sensitive and high-strung,” Svetlana writes, “quivering with sensibility … too thin-skinned, sensitive and generous to come through this fearful life unscathed.” Her mother was above all a revolutionary idealist of the 1917 generation, married at seventeen to a hardened

revolutionary operative more than twice her age. The marriage itself symbolized the battle for the soul of the Revolution.

Other sources suggest that Nadya Alliluyeva was pregnant in 1919 and the marriage not altogether voluntary. In any case, Stalin could not have been an easy husband. Less than four years after the marriage, Lenin, dictating his famous testament, called him “too crude” and proposed his removal as secretary-general of the Party. Crude he unquestionably was. Yakov, his son by his first marriage, despairing over his relationship with his father, attempted suicide but succeeded only in wounding himself. “My father,” Svetlana reports, “made fun of him and liked to sneer, ‘Ha! he couldn’t even shoot straight!’ ”

Nadya, according to the daughter, retained a “holy faith” in the ideals of the Revolution. Stalin “had once seemed to her the highest embodiment of the revolutionary New Man.” But in time she could no longer evade the knowledge that he was steering

the Revolution along dangerous paths. “She suffered the most terrible, devastating disillusionment.” There is independent testimony (Alexander Orlov, Alexander Barmine, Victor Serge, Victor Kravchenko) that Nadya was appalled by the violence, repression, and famine which came in the wake of the forced collectivization of the countryside. The husband grew more unresponsive and irascible. The wife became silent, melancholy, old before her time.

In November, 1932, the Communist grandees gathered for a banquet to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the Revolution. Stalin loudly insisted that Nadya take a drink. Nadya, who never drank herself and was frightened by the effect of alcohol on her husband, refused. As he pressed her, she rose from her seat, ran from the room, and returning to her apartment in the Kremlin, shot herself. She left behind a letter for her husband, “a terrible letter,” Svetlana says, “full of reproaches and accusations. It wasn’t purely personal; it was partly political as well.”

his, at any rate, was the story told Svetlana by her mother’s relatives and her nurse when, ten years later, she came upon a casual reference to Nadya’s suicide in the pages of an English or American magazine. In 1932 the story had been put out that her mother had died of acute appendicitis; it had never occurred to the young daughter to doubt this. The question of Nadya’s death cannot, however, be considered completely solved. Elizabeth Lermolo served in a forced-labor camp with a woman named Natalia Trushina, a member of the Stalin household; and Trushina’s testimony, as reported in Lermolo’s Face of a Victim, is that Stalin himself came back to the Kremlin, upbraided his wife, and finally shot her. The weight of evidence favors the suicide theory, but the other cannot be absolutely dismissed. Conceivably Stalin did return and the last bitter quarrel drove Nadya to shoot herself.

Whatever happened, Svetlana’s life underwent little outward change. “For ten years after my mother died, my father was a good father to me.” She saw him practically every day in the winter and accompanied him to Sochi in the summer. But there were subtle alterations in the atmosphere, perhaps perceived more vividly in retrospect than at the time. As the state took over her father’s various households, things became impersonal, institutional, even a little menacing. The increasing anxiety and depression in her mother’s family troubled her. She was dimly aware (very dimly: she was only eleven in 1937) of a larger malaise in Soviet society when her mother’s relatives and parents of school friends began inexplicably to disappear. Despite the external continuities of life, “inwardly things had changed catastrophically. Something had snapped inside my father.”

In Svetlana’s backward look, her mother’s suicide pushed her father over the brink into paranoia. Unquestionably she makes the process too clear-cut. In the early autumn of 1932 Stalin was already experimenting with the techniques which would mark his tyranny later in the decade. Riutin, his chief of propaganda, had circulated a memorandum calling for his removal by the Central Committee. Though the procedure suggested was entirely constitutional, Stalin had Riutin and his group arrested, claimed they wanted to murder him, and called for their execution. He had not before sought the death penalty for opponents within the Party. Already in his world dissent was becoming treason, political criticism a personal assault. The Central Committee, led by Kirov, rejected Stalin’s demand. A month after this defeat, Nadya killed herself.

This accelerated, but did not initiate, the descent into madness.

It was, Svetlana writes, “a dreadful crushing, blow, and it destroyed his faith in his friends and people in general… He viewed her death as a betrayal and a stab in the back.” In his last years, Stalin returned again and again in conversation to his wife’s suicide, talking incessantly to his daughter about it, “nearly driving me out of my mind.” Sometimes he would curse the “Vile book” Nadya had been reading shortly before her death—of all things, Michael Arlen’s The Green Hat (which concludes, of course, with the suicide of Iris March). More often he tried to pursue through the labyrinthine ways of his own mind the answer to the question, who put her up to it? He obviously held Nadya’s family accountable and before he was through, he sent half its members to Siberia. And if his enemies had penetrated into his very household, how powerful they must be in the country at large!

Paranoia is an elusive illness. “The most striking characteristic of symptom-formation in paranoia,” Freud has written, “is the process which deserves the name of projection. An internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain degree of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception.” Paranoiacs betray themselves by the tendency to attribute their own unconscious designs to others and to see the world as a conspiracy against themselves. They do always betray themselves by obviously neurotic or deranged behavior. They can be capable of the utmost reasonableness and lucidity. So during the second World War Stalin impressed Churchill, Roosevelt, Beaverbrook, Hopkins, and all the English and Americans who encountered him as a man of immense sense and capacity.

Yet the paranoia remained. In the “secret speech” of 1956, Khrushchev said of Stalin in the thirties, “Everywhere and in everything he saw enemies,’ ‘double-dealers’ and ‘spies.’ ” His daughters language is almost identical: “He saw enemies everywhere. It had reached the point of being pathological, of persecution mania.” Moreover,

once he had cast out of his heart someone he had known for a long time, once he had mentally relegated that someone to the ranks of his enemies, it was impossible to talk to him about that person …. Any effort to persuade him … made him furious …. All [that] accomplished was loss of access to my father and total forfeiture of his trust … . He was in the grip of an iron logic whereby once you said A, then B and C have to follow.

Once he accepted the premise that X was his enemy, the premise became axiomatic, and no matter what the facts might be, they had to be made to fit. My father was unable ever to go back psychologically to believing that X wasn’t an enemy but an honest man after all. At this point and this was where his cruel, implacable nature showed itself the past ceased to exist for him. Years of friendship and fighting side by side in a common cause might as well never have been.
This is a hard judgment for any daughter to make of any father, and Alliluyeva may be forgiven for not resting comfortably in it. Suddenly one finds a cry of anguish: did her mother’s death, she asks, “simply leave my father free to do what he would have done in any case? … Could she have halted the terrible process had she lived?” With courage, the daughter answers her own question: “I doubt it.” If this were so, “didn’t she fire her shot then out of a logic that was profoundly inevitable?”

till, without exonerating her father, she cannot bring herself to hold him exclusively responsible for the corruption of the Revolution. An understandable filial ambivalence runs through her handling of this problem. She is often protective of her father: at one time she writes that his persecution mania “was all a result of being lonely and desolate.” (In a sentence cut from the American edition, she even says that her father never killed anything but hares and hawks, and these not often.) In what historians will find the most novel and problematic part of her book, she offers up L. P. Beria as Stalin’s evil genius. Her thesis is that Beria played upon her father’s paranoia, fed it, manipulated it for his own purposes, until Stalin ended as the prisoner of the system of terror, which he himself had created.

Beria, it will be recalled, was, like Stalin, a Georgian. He rose through the state security services, and by 1930 he was running the OGPU in Transcaucasia. He progressed from this to the secretary-generalship of the Caucasian Party, in which capacity he wrote a sycophantic book about Stalin’s role in the Communist Party in the Caucasus. In 1938 he came to Moscow and soon became head of the secret police.

He appears in Twenty Letters as the villain in a Russian fairy tale—”utterly degenerate,” “this monster,” “the embodiment of Oriental perfidy, flattery, and hypocrisy.” Her mother, Svetlana says, saw through him from the start and forbade him the house as early as 1929. “Everyone close to us hated him … . Everyone in the family loathed him.” Whispering slyly to Stalin, his pince-nez gleaming in a corner, “with typical cunning Beria played on my father’s bitterness and sense of loss” after Nadya’s death. By 1937 or 1938 he had planted his cousin in Stalin’s entourage as housekeeper and his “personal spy.” “My father,” Svetlana writes, “was astonishingly helpless before Beria’s machinations. All Beria had to do was to bring him the record of the interrogation in which X ‘confessed,’ or others ‘confessed’ for him or, worse yet, X refused to ‘confess.’” After he came to Moscow,

he saw my father every day. His influence on my father grew and never ceased until the day of my father’s death. I speak advisedly of this influence on my father and not the other way around. Beria was more treacherous, more practiced in perfidy and cunning, more insolent and single-minded, than my father. In a word, he was a stronger character.

In a good many things Beria and my father were guilty together. I am not trying to shift the blame from one to the other. At some point, unfortunately, they became spiritually inseparable. The spell cast by this terrifying evil genius on my father was extremely powerful, and it never failed to work.
So Beria and his associates cut off Stalin from his old friends, stimulated his pathological suspicions, pushed him in one direction or another as they wished, until “all powerful as he was, he was impotent in the face of the frightful system that had grown up around him like a huge honeycomb, and he was helpless either to destroy it or bring it under control.”

We simply do not have enough knowledge at this point to know whether Alliluyeva’s thesis about Beria is correct. But there is reason to suspect that filial piety leads her to see his relationship to her father with exaggerated intensity. Thus the next event, after Nadya’s death, in propelling Stalin toward the madness of the purges was the murder of Kirov in December, 1934. Kirov was emerging more clearly than ever, according to the testimony of Bukharin, as the champion “of the abolition of the terror, both in general and inside the party.” His assassination gave Stalin a pretext for renewing and extending the terror; and Khrushchev later said in the “secret speech” of 1956 that Kirov’s murderer had been “assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov.” The Soviet security services seem definitely to have been involved. Some have supposed that Stalin himself arranged for the disposal of a potential rival.

Alliluyeva denies this. She describes her father as “shattered…by the death of both my mother and Kirov…I’ll never believe my father was involved in this particular death…Kirov was close to my father and my father needed him. I remember when we got the awful news that Kirov was dead, and how shaken everybody was.” To the daughter it seemed “more logical to link his killing with the name of Beria rather than with my father.” Perhaps; but in December, 1934, Beria was only secretary-general of the Communist Party in Transcaucasia. The case against Stalin is stronger, and against the secret police strongest of all; it is conceivable that Yagoda, then head of the NKVD, seeing Kirov as the main threat to the power of the police, took matters into his own hands and assumed Stalin’s tacit consent. Beria had NKVD connections, but he did not become head of the secret police for another four years.

Moreover, it is far from clear that Beria’s spell “never failed to work” or that his influence “never ceased until the day of my father’s death.” Again no one can know with certitude; but there is some suggestion that Beria fell into a certain disfavor in Stalin’s last years. In November, 1952, he was dropped from fourth to sixth in the Politburo’s order of precedence. In his “secret speech” Khrushchev tried to make Beria (who himself had been killed by his colleagues after Stalin’s death) a secondary scapegoat; but even he blamed only one of the three great post-war scandals—the Leningrad affair of 1949—on Beria. He did not try to implicate Beria personally in either the Mingrelian conspiracy of 1951-1952 or the doctors’ plot of 1953. Boris Nicolaievsky has argued that the Mingrelian purge weakened Beria’s position; and the doctors’ plot, with its implied criticism of the efficiency of the secret police, might well, if followed up, have eventually involved Beria himself. (A month after Stalin’s death, when Beria was Minister of the Interior, a number of both the Mingrelian “conspirators” and the doctors were rehabilitated.)

Some alleged eyewitness accounts of Stalin’s last hours have Beria shouting jubilantly, “The tyrant is dead, dead, dead” “If Stalin was murdered,” Robert Payne has written, “the most likely candidate for murderer was Beria.” No doubt Alliluyeva is right in suggesting that on occasion the servant exploited the master. But Stalin remained the master, and Beria the servant.

lliluyeva’s own relations with her father underwent a basic change in the winter of 1942-1943 as she approached her seventeenth birthday. Several things contributed to this. One was her appalled discovery that her mother had committed suicide. Another was her father’s callous treatment of her half brother’s wife, who was arrested after her husband was captured by the Germans, and, of her full brother, Vassily, whom he humiliated, browbeat, and left an alcoholic. Still another was Stalin’s brutal intervention when he learned that Svetlana was emotionally involved with Alexei Kapler, a Jewish film writer. Stalin, furious, had Kapler arrested as a British spy and sent off to Siberia. It was then that he slapped his daughter twice across the face. Thereafter they did not speak for months. “I was never again the beloved daughter I had once been.”

Stalin lived on for ten more years. It was an increasingly solitary, morbid, and claustrophobic existence. He never once saw, for example, five of his eight grandchildren. He was so little aware of the change in the value of the ruble that when he occasionally gave Svetlana a few notes, “he thought he was giving me a million.” He regarded public applause with increasing cynicism. At the Bolshoi Theater on his seventieth birthday, Svetlana could see his face twitching with annoyance. “They open their mouths and yell like fools,” he would say in tones of angry contempt. He had his various dachas built and rebuilt, but none satisfied him. In the end, he lived in a single room and made do for everything—working, eating, sleeping.

Svetlana went through two marriages and divorces (Stalin refused to meet her first husband another Jew), pursued an independent life as student, began to move in the literary circles of Moscow. Once in a long while she brought her children on a visit to their grandfather. She had not seen Stalin for four months when, on March 1953, she was called out of French class at the Academy to receive a message that Malenkov wanted her to come immediately to her father’s dacha at Kuntsevo.

Her account of the next three days has almost a mythological quality, in the sense not of being false but of being fantastic on a grand scale. “There was only one person who was behaving in a way that was very nearly obscene,” she remembers.

That was Beria. He was extremely agitated. His face repulsive enough at the best of times, was now twisted by his passions, by ambition, cruelty, cunning and a lust for power and more power still.

Meanwhile her father lay unconscious. Several times he opened his eyes, but his gaze was clouded, and no one knew whether he recognized anyone. Then he began to hemorrhage; his breathing became shorter; his face grew dark; his lips turned black; “the last hours were nothing but a slow strangulation.” At what seemed the final moment, he suddenly opened his eyes and cast a glance over the room.

It was a terrible glance, insane or perhaps angry and full of the fear of death … . The glance swept over everyone in a second. Then something incomprehensible and awesome happened that to this day I can’t forget and don’t understand. He suddenly lifted his left hand as though he were pointing to something above and bringing down a curse on us all. The gesture was incomprehensible and full of menace, and no one could say to whom or at what it might be directed. The next moment, after a final effort, the spirit wrenched itself free of the flesh.
So it all ended. In the next years Alliluyeva brooded over her father and the past, living, as she writes, a “weird and preposterous double life.” Her outer life on the fringe of the government elite was secure enough. But her inner life became one of “total alienation from all these people, from their customs and interests, their spirit and deeds.” A religious impulse, perhaps implanted by her grandmother and her nurse, began to flower within her. By the time she was thirty-five, “I, who’d been taught from earliest childhood by society and my family to be an atheist and materialist, was already one of those who cannot live without God…It’s simpler to divide people today into believers and unbelievers.”

The mystique of the Revolution vanished: “No revolution ever destroyed so much of value for the people as our Russian Revolution.” But the new generation, she hopes, will read these pages in their country’s history “with a feeling of pain, contrition and bewilderment, and they’ll be led by this feeling to live their lives differently.” They want to be happy; they want bright colors, fireworks, noise, excitement; they want culture and knowledge; “they want the way of life the rest of Europe has enjoyed for so long to come to Russia at last.” For Russia, she concludes, is greater than the Revolution. “No matter how cruel and harsh our country may be … no one who loves Russia in his heart will ever betray her or give her up or run away in search of material comfort. Her beauty, tranquil and wise, shines like a soft, sorrowful light from the pale sky. It will survive everything and go on forever.”

There will no doubt be much righteous comment about this book. Some will feel that Alliluyeva is too lenient toward her father; but greater severity would have asked a great deal from human nature. Others—those who believe that the function of contemporary history is to protect the reputation of politicians and express indignation over disclosures about high government officials—ought logically to be more outraged than ever over a daughter’s revelations about her father; no doubt the fact that Stalin was a Communist will make it all right this time.

In any case, the conception of history as a toady to power is indecent. The private words and actions of public men, insofar as they illuminate their public deeds and policies, are an essential part of the historical record. For the obligation of history is to provide as full and exact a reconstruction of the past as possible—as the obligation of rational society is to offer its citizenry the most accurate possible information about the purpose and performance of its leaders.

The Russians are considerably upset over Twenty Letters to a Friend. They take it as the climax of a carefully orchestrated American campaign to spoil their sacred fiftieth anniversary; indeed, they took it so hard this summer that there seemed to some good reason to defer publication of the book for a few weeks until the obsequies were over. Eventually they sought to take the edge off the book by leaking portions of it well in advance. One can understand their anger over a woman who, in their view, has done precisely what she herself condemned—betrayed her native land, given it up, run away in search of material comfort. How would Americans have felt at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence if the British, a month before July 4, 1826, had published a book by a daughter of George Washington exposing the glorious experiment as a racket and a fraud?

But the Russians are wrong. This book is not the work of a sensationalist or a traitor. It is wrung from an agonized conscience and a sickened heart. It is a deeply, ineradicably, Russian book. It is a testament which, someday, one must hope, Russians will be free to read—and will then be grateful to Svetlana Alliluyeva for the witness she has so courageously and movingly borne.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1967/11/twenty-letters-to-a-father/3396/

The Generals Have No Clothes-KAPIL KOMIREDDI

Posted by admin On November - 29 - 2011 Comments Off

Islamabad’s generals have been sponsoring the deaths of Americans for years, and yet Obama does nothing. Why?
Pakistan is indignant about the killing of 25 of its troops in a NATO air raid on Saturday. The circumstances that led to the assault are still unknown, but Washington and Europe have expressed contrition and promised an investigation. Pakistan has every reason to feel angry. But after a suitable period of mourning, shouldn’t the United States, in the interests of fairness if nothing else, ask the Pakistani army if it plans ever to apologize for — or, at bare minimum, acknowledge — its role in the deaths of hundreds of coalition forces and many more Afghan civilians?

At the start of the 21st century, the United States offered Pakistan a very straightforward ultimatum: Join us in the war against terrorism inaugurated by al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11 — or find yourself bombed to the Stone Age. In the decade since, Pakistan has arguably been responsible for more American deaths than any other state on earth. Yet Pakistan has not only evaded prosecution for its crimes. In a staggering turn of events, its army has found its program of sponsoring the slaughter of American troops in Afghanistan by the Taliban and al Qaeda amply subsidized by Washington.

One of the most principled voices against the Pakistani army during this time belonged, ironically, to Islamabad’s ambassador to Washington. Husain Haqqani was, to repurpose Nirad Chaudhuri’s phrase about Pandit Nehru, not only Pakistan’s representative to the United States but also the West’s ambassador to Pakistan. His resignation, offered and accepted on Tuesday, was ostensibly precipitated by an op-ed last month in the Financial Times by Mansoor Ijaz, an American businessman of Pakistani descent who claimed that an unnamed Pakistani diplomat — whom he later identified as Haqqani — had conscripted him in a grand scheme to curb the Pakistani military’s power. Together, he alleged, they crafted a memo in which a series of dramatic offers were made to Washington — among them, the promise to end state patronage of terrorism — in return for the Obama administration’s help in reining in the generals. (Haqqani vigorously denies involvement.)

Inexplicably, Ijaz, the courageous anti-military conspirator, transformed, without a hint of irony, into the army’s canary, imperilling Pakistan’s besieged civilian government by volunteering transcripts of his alleged exchanges with Haqqani. Pakistan’s rightwing media served as his bullhorn, devoting their pages and program to his endless revelations. (Hardly anyone in the West accorded serious attention to Ijaz — a clownish Croesus addicted to self-elevating fantasies. If only the Clinton administration had given attention to his “deal” with the Sudanese government to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United States, he once bragged, 9/11 would have been averted.)

The author of a devastatingly frank history of Pakistan, Haqqani has the virtue of clarity: He is known to view the army as an impediment to progress in the region. Still, it is stupefying to imagine that a diplomat and scholar of his sophistication would have recruited a pestilent popinjay like Ijaz to deliver a message that he could quite competently

have communicated through other channels, or in person. The rapidity with which Ijaz has switched sides, meeting the ISI chief in London last month to handover “evidence” implicating his co-conspirator, strongly suggests that it is Haqqani who is the victim of a conspiracy.

Sherry Rehman, a formidable politician from Sindh, has now replaced Haqqani. But his forced resignation puts an end to the pretence of civilian rule in Pakistan — and heralds the unapologetically solemn re-takeover of the country by the military-intelligence camorra that spawned the forces of destruction in Afghanistan. So it is astounding that, rather than treating Haqqani’s departure as a setback, officials in the Obama administration see it as something of a boon. Haqqani’s private criticisms of the Pakistani army led, according to a report in the New York Times, “to a diminishing of his influence in Washington, especially in the White House.”

Why would the White House choose to belittle a man championing civilian rule in Pakistan? Isn’t that also the objective of the Obama administration

? The answer increasingly appears to be no.

Since the 1950s, when Gen. Ayub Khan mounted the first military coup, Pakistan’s army has etiolated the country’s evolution in every imaginable sense. Rooted in a culture of grievance and malevolence that is the foundational basis of Pakistan, the army has waged wars against India, suffused young minds with a fervor for jihad, sponsored terrorism, spread xenophobia and racism, carried out genocide against millions of its own citizens, stolen and smuggled nuclear secrets, foisted the vile Taliban regime upon the defenseless people of Afghanistan, and assumed complete ownership of Pakistan.

For wars and terrorist violence in South Asia to abate, Pakistan will have to resemble something approaching a normal state. The equation for that is simple: The army must return to the barracks.

Obama had an almost providential opportunity to squeeze the army in the immediate aftermath of bin Laden’ s di

scovery in May in the garrison city of Abbottabad. The khakis were at their weakest in four decades. That was the time to bolster civilian rule, to corral the army with fresh ultimatums. Instead, Obama seemed more anxious about pacifying Pakistan for having breached its sovereignty than holding its army to account for harboring bin Laden — which explains the White House’s rush to finesse Amb. Mike Mullen’s candid testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in September.

Then, in a craven abdication of American responsibility to the citizens of Afghanistan, Obama talked about the need for nation-building at home. For a man who attained the presidency by invoking Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, Obama has rarely displayed any compunction in retreating from battle with men who, given the opportunity, would have lynched King and Gandhi — indeed men who have presided over the slaughter and torture of too many potential Kings and Gandhis of our age. Could there be a more forceful testament to the failure of Obama’s foreign policy in South Asia than the sight of terrorist leader Sirajuddin Haqqani operating with impunity in Pakistan six months after bin Laden’s killing?

Rehman, the new Pakistani ambassador, is a socially liberal pro-democracy politician. But disturbingly, and unlike her predecessor, she subscribes to the Pakistani army’s view of Afghanistan: Any government in Kabul must be pro-Pakistan. This should hardly seem worth worrying about — except that “pro-Pakistan,” in the context of Afghanistan, means anti-India, anti-America, and, more troublingly, anti-Afghan.

Bluntly, it means a Pakistani colony of the pre-2001 variety that hosted bin Laden, not a sovereign state with independent policymaking prerogatives. This explains why an overwhelming majority of Afghans, whenever given the chance, express only the deepest contempt for Pakistan.

The Pakistani army has responded to the NATO attack by blocking supply routes to the coalition forces. It has also issued a notice to close down the U.S.-run airbase in Shamsi. The proportional response to Pakistan’s denial of its territory to the United States would be to limit Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. It is the United States that has secured Afghanistan; if Pakistan wants a role, it had better pay its dues. Instead, Washington grovels before Islamabad even as American soldiers die at the hands of Pakistan’s clients.

Faced with a re-election campaign, Obama is seeking to obtain a cosmetic “end” to the mission in Afghanistan by cutting deals with the Pakistani army and its clients in the Taliban. This will involve a reduced presence of American troops on the ground, a heightened use of targeted drone strikes, and, to keep this arrangement, bribes to the Pakistan army in the form of vaguely conditional aid. Relations between the United States and Pakistan will return to “normal” in short order. A poltroon deal will be struck with the Taliban chieftains. As the fighters currently enjoying Pakistani hospitality in the country’s northwest make their way back into Afghanistan, the gains made over the last decade will wither away. Thus will the tremendous sacrifices, of both American troops and Afghan civilians, be honored. For the citizens of Pakistan and Afghanistan, this will signal the start of yet another prolonged period of violence. President Obama will call it victory.
Kapil Komireddi is an Indian journalist.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_generals_have_no_clothes?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

A Marxist History of the World : What is Capitalism?-Neil Faulkner

Posted by admin On November - 27 - 2011 Comments Off

A 19th century textile-mill

 

In this critical chapter of his world history, Neil Faulkner explores capitalism and what it means from the Industrial Revolution to the present day.
The Industrial Revolution has transformed the global economy as completely as the Agricultural Revolution once did. These are the only two transformations in human social development that have been all-encompassing in their impact.

The Agricultural Revolution ended an earlier existence based on hunting and gathering in the wilderness. It created a world of farmers in which people produced their own food.

Farming made possible huge increases in productivity and output. This in turn made possible the accumulation of surpluses able to support non-productive social classes.

The surpluses appropriated by ruling classes were used to maintain armies and engage in politico-military competition with other ruling classes.

Despite many great changes, there is, in this respect, an essential similarity between, say, Sumerian civilisation around 2500 BCE, the Roman Empire of the 2nd century AD, and Louis XIV’s France in 1700.

In each case, ruling classes appropriated the surpluses of agricultural producers in the form of taxes and tithes, customs duties and tolls, interest on debts, and rents and labour-services. These surpluses sustained armies and wars between states. They were also invested in palaces, great monuments, and the luxury trades.

Militarism and grandeur were competitive. The tension and rivalry between ruling classes made the system a dynamic one.

But they were also wasteful.

War-chariots and temples, armoured knights and castles, royal cannon and the Palace of Versailles drained wealth out of the economy. Surpluses were not invested in technical innovation and improvement. Consequently, in pre-industrial society, increases in the productivity of human labour were slow in coming.

The contrast with industrial capitalism could not be more stark. Marx describes it in a famous passage in The Communist Manifesto:
Karl Marx’s Capital is the essential starting-point for any scientific understanding of modern capitalism
‘The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was … the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air …’

The world’s population reached an estimated 200 million about 2,500 years ago. It did not reach one billion until about 200 years ago. Since then, it has risen to seven billion. That means population growth has been 18 times faster since the Industrial Revolution.

The Roman Empire is estimated to have manufactured about 85,000 tonnes of iron per year. By 1900, the five main producing countries were turning out this tonnage every day. Today, the top five turn out the same tonnage every hour.

How are we to explain this transformation? The answer is given in Volume I of Marx’s Capital, published in 1867. This text is the indispensable starting-point for any scientific analysis of the modern world economy.

Marx begins with the commodity – the basic building-block of a capitalist economy – and explains that it has both ‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value’. The use-value of a banana is its nutritional content for a hungry person. Its exchange-value is represented by its market price.

There is at once a potential disconnect: a contradiction-in-the-making between the use-value and exchange-value of a commodity. Bananas may be needed and available – but unaffordable to the hungry.

Use-value is dominant in pre-capitalist exchange. The merchant is simply an intermediary between the producer selling a surplus and the consumer with a need. A yeoman-farmer may sell his surplus grain in order to buy a new plough. A rich lord may buy the grain to feed his household retainers. The merchant makes a profit, but his social role is simply that of economic intermediary between other classes.

Exchange-value is dominant under capitalism. Merchants always buy only in order to sell at a profit. Their principle
When the principle of the merchant became that of society at large, capitalism was born
is exchange for its own sake. When the principle of the merchant becomes the general principle of society, we make the transition to capitalism.

The commercial capitalism of 17th century Holland and 18th century England was that of merchants accumulating capital through trade. But accumulations of merchant-capital could then fund investment in the canals, machines, and factories of the Industrial Revolution. And industrialisation made possible yet greater capital accumulation.

By 1800, capitalism was airborne. A self-feeding process of exponential growth had begun. What powered it was competition. Not the politico-military competition of ancient city-states and medieval kingdoms. But the economic competition of rival capitalists.

The spinning-jenny meant that one worker could produce as much yarn as eight working alone. The power-loom enabled one operator to do the work of six hand-loom weavers.

Capitalists who did not invest in new technology quickly found themselves priced out of the market by low-cost competitors using labour-saving machinery. They discovered the iron law of the market. The pressure of economic competition compelled each and every one to cut costs, increase output, and reduce prices.

The measure of success was profit. The most successful capitalists captured a larger share of the market and made bigger profits. These profits were then reinvested in the business to enhance competitiveness further.

Capitalism is, then, a system of competitive capital accumulation.

It is the result of the dynamic fusion of three elements: the merchant principle of buying in order to sell at a profit; the transformation of labour productivity made possible by industrial innovation; and the division of the economy into competing units of capital.

It is a highly contradictory system. Economic competition is blind and anarchic. Surges of investment lead to overproduction, unsold goods, and waves of bankruptcy. Boom turns to bust. Bubbles burst and become black holes of bad debt. Wealth is wasted, and wealth-creation collapses.

Even when it booms, the system is deeply flawed. The source of all wealth is the labour of working people. The profits of the capitalist class therefore depend upon a process of exploitation at the heart of the system.

Marx’s special contribution to ‘the labour theory of value’ was to grasp that workers’ wages were payment not for their labour, but for their labour-power.

The point is this. Under capitalism, labour produces the wealth represented by both wages and profit. Therefore, wages cannot represent the full value of the labour expended in the production process.
Alienation and exploitation is intrinsic to capitalism
What the capitalist buys in return for wages is the worker’s capacity to labour at a certain level of skill for a fixed period of time. What he expects to gain from this is value-added in production in excess of the value-paid in wages. The difference between the two is ‘surplus-value’ or profit.

The worker under capitalism is therefore ‘alienated’ by lack of control over the production process, and ‘exploited’ as the source of profit and capital accumulation. Endemic class conflict is the consequence. Capitalists and workers are locked in an eternal struggle over process and reward at the point of production.

Capitalism has transformed the productivity of human labour and created such an abundance of material wealth that a solution to humanity’s many problems has become a practical possibility.

Yet that promise is negated by the system. On the one hand, competition and free-market anarchy mean a highly contradictory economy subject to crashes, slumps, and mass impoverishment. On the other, the alienation and exploitation of the workplace mean that most people’s working lives are a treadmill of toil and stress.
http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world/15210-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-part-54-what-is-capitalism

What makes a regional chaudhry?-Ardeshir Cowasjee

Posted by admin On November - 27 - 2011 Comments Off

SOON after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement earlier this year that America was “betting” on India’s future and sought Indian presence beyond the region, numerous articles were written in Pakistani papers with titles such as ‘US daydreaming’, ‘Sponsoring India’s rise’, ‘Challenging regional environment’ and ‘America plays Indian game’.

The common theme of these articles, duly backed by the rantings of our television anchors, was that the US is ‘sponsoring’ India’s rise as a major power and since India is Pakistan’s eternal enemy, such US sponsorship of our eternal enemy should be unacceptable to and resisted by us.

Are major powers really sponsored and created by others? Our intellectually challenged prime minister summarised the contrived national sentiment when he said that Pakistan would not accept a chaudhry or hegemon in the South Asian region.

But if no one sponsored the rise of China as a major power, why should it be difficult for us to admit that international powers
emerge based on their economic, political and military strength

? They are not sponsored by other major powers.

According to Paul Kennedy, author of The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, those states emerge and survive as great powers that are able to maintain a “balance of military and economic strength”. As Kennedy notes, “great power ascendancy correlates strongly to available resources and economic durability; military overstretch and a concomitant relative decline are the consistent threat facing powers whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for”. In other words, great world powers are made by their own achievements and through recognition by peers.

Liking or disliking another country or its policies has nothing to do with great power status. The United States and its western allies did not agree with Soviet communist ideology but could not deny that the Soviet Union was a superpower.

Similarly, until the 1970s communist China was not recognised by many countries around the world and faced tremendous economic and social upheavals. But no one could deny China’s status as a great civilisation and whether or not the existing powers agreed with the views and ideology of Mao Zedong, they had to acknowledge China as a great power.

Both China and India are 5,000-year old civilisations, which have now re-emerged on the global stage. When leading countries around the world seek to build ties with India, it is not a case of ‘sponsoring’ or ‘promoting’ or ‘seeking’ India’s rise as a great power, but of acknowledging a reality. It would be to Pakistan’s advantage, too, to learn to accept reality as the basis of foreign policy.

India is currently population-wise the second largest country in the world, after China, and the world’s most populous democracy. Its GDP stands at $1.43tr (at official rates) and its GDP growth rate has ranged between eight and nine per cent for the last five years, despite the global economic downturn.

By 2030 India will become the world’s third largest economy after US and China. India’s foreign exchange reserves stand at $294bn and annual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Indian economy stands at around $25bn. The India-China bilateral trade stands at around $60bn annually and India-US bilateral trade around $55bn.

From being a country which received aid, India has now become an aid-provider both bilaterally as well as through multilateral institutions. Along with other fast-growing economies like Brazil, Russia and China, in 2009 India offered $10bn to the IMF to be provided to countries needing assistance.

India is currently providing around $2bn in aid to Afghanistan and this year it is offering a $5.4bn credit line for development projects in Africa — all this at a time when Pakistan is having trouble securing $3bn in loans from the IMF.

India’s higher education system in the world with around 350 universities and 16,000 colleges produces around 14,000 PhDs annually. We know India’s military prowess but ignore its soft power: India has hosted the Asian Games twice, the 2010 Commonwealth Games and the Cricket World Cup in 2011 along with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Bollywood is the world’s largest film industry and in 2009 alone produced 2,961 films.

Our leaders remain reluctant to educate our people of these facts, let alone recognise emerging global realities. Politicians and the media persist in keeping our illiterate and semi-literate public in a mythical universe. Those, to name but one, our former ambassador in Washington, who have studied and taught international relations advocate realism in speeches and writings that are published and commented on abroad only to be ignored at home. Educated realists are denigrated on an almost daily basis as if their reference to facts is somehow blasphemous or unpatriotic.

Husain Haqqani has been dislodged through what appears to be clumsy intrigue by manipulators up to no good. The affair of the mystery memo has been described as “an invented scandal to oust a long-time critic and weaken the civilian government”.

According to US Senator John Kerry, Pakistan has lost “a strong advocate for his country and the Pakistani people … [his] wisdom and insights will be missed….”.

Now to Imran Khan — has he joined the ranks of demagogue-politicians by calling upon the nation to turn to its mythical prowess and look its external enemies including India and the US in the eye?

As commented one realist — to look another in the eye one must be approximately of the same height.

If we want to be a chaudhry let us work on becoming one.

Perhaps we can begin by focusing on building a world-class educational system and develop the nation’s economy quietly for a few years, without the usual bravado and chest-thumping.

Is that so difficult?
http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/27/what-makes-a-regional-chaudhry.html

Can China’s centre hold?-Raffaello Pantucci

Posted by admin On November - 27 - 2011 Comments Off

As regions such as Xinjiang and Guangdong get richer and more powerful, it may be harder to govern from Beijing
Next year, China’s leadership changes. But as Chinese scholars, experts and officials are constantly reminding me, we should not expect any sudden or major shift in government policy. The rigid structure of Chinese government means that policy decisions are locked into place before leaders get a chance to shape them. And former leaders retain positions of influence and power behind the scenes.

Xi Jinping will likely become the international face of the Communist party, but Hu Jintao will, like his predecessors, retain a powerful position within the Chinese system. World leaders will find themselves dealing with a new character, though, as a Shanghai-based scholar told me: “leaders are not that important in foreign policy formation.”

Beneath this smooth exterior, however, there are fierce debates within the party about new “interest groups” in the system. This is shorthand for the growing fractionalisation in Chinese policymaking, a result of an increasing diffusion of power throughout the country. On the face of it, China remains a one-party state ruled by a central Politburo Standing Committee of nine men, but in reality an increasing number of actors influence the decision-making process.

Understanding the different roles these actors play is a parlour game among China watchers, but the trend is undeniably important.

In a report late last year, entitled Inside the growth engine: a guide to China’s regions, provinces and cities, British bank HSBC advised: “anyone hoping to conclude a business deal in China…don’t assume you only have to deal with decision-makers in Beijing.”

A few months after the report came out, I met a local business representative from a European company in China. He described business in Shanghai and nearby provinces where his company had operations as typically opaque: what happens on the ground often differs substantially from the official line issued in Beijing. As the old Chinese saying goes: “the hills are high and the Emperor is far away.”

The regions’ newfound power is not all that surprising. China’s growth, after all, is mostly generated in a few coastal provinces. Guangdong, the nation’s powerhouse, accounts for over ten per cent of GDP and almost 30 per cent of the country’s exports (according to 2010 and 2009 figures respectively). This gives the regional governor a certain amount of power both domestically and on the international stage.

In October last year, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua made a trip through Egypt, Israel and India in which he signed deals worth $9.12 billion and was hosted like a visiting state leader. During the trip he met with Israeli President Shimon Peres who “spoke highly of Guangdong’s energetic economy,” according to the official press release, and the two discussed ways that Israel and Guangdong could cooperate better on high technology development.

In some cases, provinces seem to be resisting central rule. On a trip to the Xinjiang province in China’s far west last year, a local guide told me how weak the current leadership in Beijing was and how the then Xinjiang Communist Party chief Wang Lequan would refuse to pay money earned in resource-rich Xinjiang to Beijing. I have been unable to confirm the details independently, but they resonate with a strong sense of independence from the center I found in the province. In a separate instance, a foreign researcher friend told me how Beijing policymakers had taken an interest in a project they were working on, which provided insights into the regional government in Yunnan province capital Kunming—they were grateful for insights on what was happening in the southern province.

State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are also an increasingly powerful counterweight to the central government. They control about a third of total enterprise assets in China. The largest are under the direction of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)—a body the Chinese government established in 2003 to try to rein in the SOEs, which accounted collectively for about 60 per cent of GDP in 2009. Usually run by senior Communist party members, the sheer size of the SOEs gives their leaders disproportionate importance and in some cases seems to put them beyond state control.

Liu Zhenya is a particularly well-placed SOE head: he is CEO of China’s State Grid Corporation, the world’s largest utility company, ranked 7th in Fortune’s list of the top 500 global corporations. Having worked his way up through Shandong’s electricity industry, Liu turned the power companies into conglomerates managing billions in assets. During his time as head of Shandong Electric Power, he diversified the company’s portfolio into finance and securities, IT, business travel, real estate, culture and a local football team.

When State Grid took the same approach outside China, its attempts to move into copper mining in Chile were blocked. According to company insiders quoted in the Financial Times, it was Chinese regulators who blocked the deal, saying that State Grid was not a mining company. Characterised in the Chinese press as a “Frankenstein” company, State Grid has become almost a state within a state. Fleets of limousines shuttle executives around high-end compounds where they dine at private restaurants and consider the fates of their one-and-a-half million staff.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), meanwhile, has also emerged as a strong force on the global stage. As well as rhetorical sparring with the United States, it has started to assert itself along China’s sea borders with its south east Asian neighbours, much to their and others’ concern. An academic from the Party School suggested that the PLA’s assertiveness in recent years stems from a bargain they made with political leaders under Deng Xiaoping.

According to the Party School professor, when Deng was pushing his economic reforms through in the 1980s and 1990s, he asked the military to accept tighter budgets while the party focused on the economy. Now that the economy has picked up, the PLA is having its moment in the sun and flexing its muscles. When former US defence secretary Robert Gates visited China in January this year, the PLA Air Force showed off

their new stealth fighter jet, in an apparent display of one-upmanship. It put Hu Jintao in an awkward position: he was apparently as surprised as his American guests when the subject came up in a meeting.

The key lesson here is that nine men in Beijing are increasingly finding the current political system difficult to control. The booming economy has brought prosperity to China, but it has also meant that there are more powerful actors in the country than before. Without the checks and balances that a free press or a more open political system would provide, it is difficult to keep track of them. Although the internet could (and in some limited cases does) fill this gap, strict government controls mean that it is not a completely reliable watchdog. Now the Politburo Standing Committee finds itself struggling to balance an ever more complex set of power networks around

the country, as it tries to keep control at

the centre.
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/11/can-chinas-centre-hold/

Faith & feminism in Pakistan Tariq Ali: The rotten heart of Europe 'The Price of Kings': Yasser Arafat Egypt's Islamists: Threat or opportunity? Balochistan: Pakistan's other war Countering extremism in Pakistan Is the campaign for Palestinian recognition succeeding? Gaddafi : Our Best Villain "Memo Gate" - Mansoor Ijaz full interview & Husain Haqqani response Crisis, Resistance, Political Representation China's sceptical supporting a European bailout. Empire A revolution for all seasons

Fighting in the Fifth Dimension

Pervez Musharraf on U.S.–Pakistan Relations Slavoj Zizek:momentous changes The Koch Brothers

Recent Comments

Exasprated Essays in its Contemporary Politics By. Mr Mahander Mohan Gupta

Recent Comments

Recent Posts